APPELLATE PROCEDURE / INTERNATIONAL LAW—UNITED STATES V. KIRBY: THE CASE FOR APPELLATE REVIEW OF GRANTS OF BAIL BY DISTRICT COURT JUDGES IN INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION CASES by Barry, Gina
Western New England Law Review
Volume 21 21 (1999)
Issue 2 Symposium: Employment Practices Liability





V. KIRBY: THE CASE FOR APPELLATE
REVIEW OF GRANTS OF BAIL BY DISTRICT
COURT JUDGES IN INTERNATIONAL
EXTRADITION CASES
Gina Barry
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gina Barry, APPELLATE PROCEDURE / INTERNATIONAL LAW—UNITED STATES V. KIRBY: THE CASE FOR APPELLATE
REVIEW OF GRANTS OF BAIL BY DISTRICT COURT JUDGES IN INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION CASES, 21 W. New Eng.
L. Rev. 565 (1999), http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol21/iss2/11
APPELLATE PROCEDURE / INTERNATIONAL LAW­
UNITED STATES V. KIRBY: THE CASE FOR ApPELLATE REVIEW OF 
GRANTS OF BAIL BY DISTRIcr COURT JUDGES IN INTERNATIONAL 
EXTRADITION CASES 
INTRODUcrION 
Currently, appellate review is not available when bail is 
granted by district court judges in international extradition cases.1 
Review is not available because before a court can hear and decide 
any case, it must have jurisdiction? and there is no explicit grant of 
jurisdiction to the federal courts of appeals to provide review of 
grants of bail by district court judges in international extradition 
cases. 
Recently, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit undertook review of a grant of bail in an international 
extradition case, setting forth a theory of jurisdiction that confers 
on the federal courts of appeals the power. to undertake this re­
view.3 In United States v. Kirby,4 Terence Damien Kirby, Pol Bren­
nan, and Kevin Artt were potential extraditees5 who came to the 
United States after escaping from the Maze Prison in Belfast, 
Northern Ireland.6 While awaiting extradition hearings,7 the 
1. See infra note 192 for citations to cases where courts undertook review of 
grants of bail in international extradition cases without justifying their jurisdictional 
basis. 
2. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 538 (1974) (stating that jurisdiction is the 
authority conferred by Congress to decide a case); see also Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 
(7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1869) ("Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases 
to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and 
dismissing the cause."). 
3. See United States v. Kirby, 106 F.3d 855 (9th Cir. 1996). The Kirby court was 
the first to explain the jurisdictional basis for its review. See infra Part II.B.2 for a 
discussion of the majority's theory of jurisdiction. 
4. 106 F.3d 855 (9th CiT. 1996). 
5. The United Kingdom had requested extradition of all three from the United 
States. See id. at 857. 
6. See id.; see also Sandra L.M. Gosser, In re Requested Extradition ofArtt, Bren­
nan, and Kirby: Counterterrorism and the Court, 6 TuL. J. INT'L & COMPo LAW 633, 633­
34 (1998) (providing additional background material regarding the massive prison 
break at the Maze Prison in 1983 during which Kevin Artt, Pol Brennan, and Terence 
Kirby escaped). 
7. It is important to note that a bail decision made in an international extradition 
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United States District Court for the Northern District of California 
granted bail to all three.8 The United States sought appellate re­
view of these bail decisions on behalf of the United Kingdom.9 
However, the extradition treaties between the United States and 
the United Kingdom did not explicitly provide appellate jurisdic­
tion to the federal courts of appeals to review these bail decisions.lO 
The Ninth Circuit, in Kirby, was the first to explain the juris­
dictional basis of the federal courts of appeals to review grants of 
bail by district court judges in international extradition cases.ll The 
majority concluded that jurisdiction existed to hear the appeal be­
cause 28 U.S.c. § 129112 grants appellate jurisdiction to the courts 
of appeals to review all final decisions of the district courtS.13 The 
dissent, however, concluded that jurisdiction did not exist to hear 
the appeal because the bail decision was neither final, nor a deci­
sion of the "court. "14 
This Note explores the issue of whether appellate jurisdiction 
exists for the federal courts of appeals to review grants of bail by 
federal district court judges in international extradition cases. Part 
I provides a summary of the extradition process and the granting of 
bail within that process. This section also contrasts the lack of re­
view of grants of bail made in international extradition cases with 
the statutory right of the government to appeal grants of bail in 
domestic criminal cases. Part I also discusses the history of the final 
judgment rule, now embodied in 28 U.S.c. § 1291, which defines 
the appellate jurisdiction of the United States Courts of Appeals. 
Finally, Part I explains several avenues of review that circumvent 
the finality requirement of § 1291. Part II reviews the Ninth Cir­
cuit's decision in Kirby, including a discussion of both the majority 
and dissenting opinions. Part III analyzes the arguments made in 
Kirby in regard to whether jurisdiction exists in the courts of ap­
peals to review bail decisions in extradition cases. Part III then ar­
case is but one decision to be made in the extradition process. See infra Part I.A for a 
discussion of the extradition process. 
8. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 858. 
9. See id. 
10. Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, U.S.-U.K., 28 U.S.T. 227, as modified by the 
Supplementary Treaty Concerning the Extradition Treaty, June 25, 1985, U.S.-U.K., 
T.I.A.S. No. 12050. 
11. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 858. 
12. Section 1291 states that "[t]he courts of appeals ... shall have jurisdiction of 
appeals from all final decisions of the district courts." 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994). 
13. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 859-61. 
14. See id. at 866-67 (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
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gues that the Ninth Circuit could have relied on the collateral order 
doctrine15 to establish a jurisdictional basis for appellate review of 
grants of bail made by district court judges. Part III further argues 
that the Supreme Court should use its rule-making power, found in 
28 U.S.c. §§ 2072(c)16 and 1292(e),17 to define finality and thereby 
eliminate the confusion surrounding whether a decision is 
appealable. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. International Extradition 
Before deciding whether a grant of bail given by a federal dis­
trict court judge during the international extradition process is ap­
pealable to the United States Courts of Appeals, it is necessary to 
understand the international extradition process.1S By doing so, an 
informed decision can be made as to what role the bail decision 
plays in the extradition process and whether the bail decision is 
reviewable. 
1. The Process of International Extradition 
Extradition is "the surrender by one nation to another of an 
individual accused or convicted of an offence [sic] outside of its own 
territory, and within the territorial jurisdiction of the other, which, 
being competent to try and punish him, demands the surrender. "19 
The international extradition process begins with a treaty between 
two sovereign nations20 and is further controlled by federal stat­
15. The collateral order doctrine provides for appellate review of non-final orders 
that conclusively determine a disputed question, resolve an important issue completely 
separate from the merits, and are effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judg­
ment. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978). See infra Part 
I.C.4.c for a thorough discussion of the collateral order doctrine. 
16. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.c. § 2072(c) (1994). 
17. Federal Courts Study Implementation Act, 28 U.S.c. § 1292(e) (1994). 
18. See generally Lis WiehJ, Article, Extradition Law at the Crossroads: The Trend 
Toward Extending Greater Constitutional Procedural Protections to Fugitives Fighting 
Extradition from the United States, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 729 (1998) (describing the his­
torical evolution of United States extradition law, discussing recent court holdings that 
the federal extradition scheme violates the Fourth Amendment, and arguing that the 
international extradition process may be undermined if further procedural protections 
continue to be added to the process). 
19. Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 289 (1902). 
20. See Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933) (stating that under 
United States law the legal right to demand extradition is only created by treaty, other­
wise it rests on comity); United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 411-12 (1886) (stating 
that delivering fugitives apart from any treaty obligation has never been recognized). 
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utes.21 Generally, the iriternational extradition process begins when 
a requesting nation files a verified complaint22 with the United 
States government charging that the person sought committed one 
or more of the crimes listed in the extradition treaty.23 
An extradition request must satisfy the terms of the applicable 
treaty. For example, a treaty may require that certain documents 
supporting the extradition request be provided, including: copies of 
the formal charge against the accused, the order for the accused's 
arrest, the relevant criminal statutes, and other evidence from 
which the accused may be identified, such as fingerprint cards or 
photographs.24 To be successful, the request for extradition must 
contain sufficient evidence showing probable cause to believe that 
an extraditable offense was committed by the person sought.25 As­
suming that the terms of the treaty have been met, the judicial 
body26 will issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused.27 Once the 
accused is brought into custody pursuant to the arrest warrant, an 
The typical extradition treaty provides a list of offenses which warrant extradition, 
a list of conditions which will prevent extradition, general procedural guidelines gov­
erning how requests are to be made and what documentation must support requests, 
and a provision governing "provisional arrest," which allows for the immediate arrest of 
the accused in cases where there is a high likelihood that the accused will flee the re­
quested nation before the requested nation receives the necessary supporting documen­
tation. See, e.g., Extradition Treaty, supra note 10. 
21. See 18 U.S.c. §§ 3181-3196 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). 
22. See id. § 3184 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). The complaint must be made under 
oath. See id. 
23. See id. For further discussion of the extradition process, see M. CtrnRIF BAS­
SIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE (3d ed. 
1996); see also M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 727-1122 (1968) 
(describing the extradition process); Jefferey A. Hall, Note, A Recommended Approach 
to Bail in International Extradition Cases, 86 MICH. L. REv. 599, 601-03 (1987) (describ­
ing the extradition process). 
24. See Marian Nash Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating 
to International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 154,157 (1982). Most treaties entered into by 
the United States require evidence that would either justify committing the accused for 
trial had he committed the crime in the United States or would show that the accused 
has already been convicted of the crime in the requesting country. See id. at 158. 
25. See 18 U.S.c. § 3184 (1994 & Supp. II 1996); see also Pettit v. Walshe, 194 
U.S. 205, 217 (1904) (stating that the evidence must be sufficient to authorize arrest and 
commitment for trial according to the law of the place where the arrestee was found); 
Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739, 744 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that probable cause is 
required for a provisional arrest and that the mere existence of Italian arrest warrants is 
not enough to establish probable cause). 
26. The judicial body in an extradition proceeding may be "any justice or judge of 
the United States, or any magistrate ... authorized to do so by a court of the United 
States, or any judge of a court of record of general jurisdiction of any State ...." 18 
U.S.C. § 3184 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). 
27. See id. 
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extradition hearing will be held to determine if he will be 
extradited.28 
An extradition hearing is not a full trial on the merits.29 
Rather, during the extradition hearing the judicial body first deter­
mines whether the extradition request is within the bounds of the 
treaty between the requesting nation and the United States. Fol­
lowing this conclusion, the court must then decide whether there is 
enough evidence to require surrender of the accused to the request­
ing nation.30 When making this determination, the judicial body 
does not determine whether the accused is guilty or innocent.31 
Rather, the judicial body only asks whether probable cause exists to 
believe the accused committed the offense charged, or whether the 
accused has already been convicted of the offense in the other na­
tion.32 If the judicial body makes an affirmative determination with 
regard to either question, the accused will be certified for extradi­
tion.33 Before certification, however, the accused may introduce 
any "defense" he or she may have against extradition.34 
28. See id.; see also BASSIOUNI, supra note 23 at 655. 
29. See Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 461 (1913) ("The proceeding is not a 
trial."); see also Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457, 463 (1888) ("[T]he proceeding 
before the Uudicial body] is not to be regarded as in the nature of a final trial by which 
the prisoner could be convicted or acquitted of the crime charged against him ...."). 
30. See 18 U.S.c. § 3184 (1994 & Supp. II 1996) (stating that the judicial body will 
determine whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions 
of the applicable treaty); see also Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 314-16 (1922) (stating 
that an extradition hearing merely decides whether there is competent evidence which, 
according to the law of the surrendering nation, would justify the accused's apprehen­
sion and commitment for trial if the crime had been committed in the surrendering 
nation); BASSIOUNI, supra note 23, at 655-56. 
31. See Collins, 259 U.S. at 314-15 (stating that it is not the function of the com­
mitting magistrate to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee); 
Charlton, 229 U.S. at 461 (explaining that the issue in an international extradition hear­
ing is limited to whether the evidence is sufficient to make it proper to hold that party 
for trial); In re Extradition of D'Amico, 185 F. Supp. 925, 927 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) ("The 
function of the Uudicial body] is not to determine whether the alleged fugitive is in fact 
guilty of the crime of which he is accused."); BASSIOUNI, supra note 23, at 703. 
32. See Ex parte Bryant, 167 U.S. 104, 105 (1897) (explaining that the requesting 
nation must show that "there was probable cause to believe him guilty of the crime 
charged"); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 (5th Cir. 1971) ("The 
existence of probable cause ... to believe the accused [is] guilty of the crime charged is 
essential to the issuance of a commitment [to extradition]."); Hall, supra note 23, at 
602-03. 
33. See 18 U.S.c. § 3184 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). The certification provides that a 
warrant shall issue for the commitment of the accused to the proper jail until he is 
surrendered upon demand of the foreign government. See id. 
34. The Supreme Court has ruled that in an international extradition proceeding 
the potential extraditee may only submit evidence to rebut the requesting nation's case, 
as opposed to putting on a full defense. See Charlton, 229 U.S. at 461-62 (excluding 
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If the judicial body determines that the accused is not extradit­
able, the United States, who acts on behalf of the requesting nation, 
has no direct route of appeal, but may refile the request to extra­
dite.35 Conversely, if the judicial body determines that the accused 
is to be certified for extradition, the accused may not appeal in the 
usual sense, but may obtain limited review of the certification for 
extradition by way of a writ of habeas corpUS.36 Notwithstanding 
this review, if the accused remains extraditable, the judicial body 
evidence of insanity); United States v. Wiebe, 733 F.2d 549, 553 n.4 (8th Cir. 1984) 
(noting that defenses of alibi or insanity may be excluded); United States ex rei. Pe­
trushansky v. Marasco, 325 F.2d 562, 567 (2d Cir. 1963) (excluding evidence that contra­
dicts the time of the murder). But see John G. Kester, Some Myths of United States 
Extradition Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 1441,1468-71 (1988) (debunking the myth that a person 
sought for extradition may not put on a defense). 
Generally, defenses to extradition include a lapse of the statute of limitations for 
the offense charged, double jeopardy, immunity from prosecution, or a "political of­
fense" exception. See Extradition Treaty, supra note 10. See generally BASSIOUNI, 
supra note 23, at 495-502. Commonly, a "political offense" exception is provided for in 
the treaty. Usually, this exception bars extradition when the person sought is being 
persecuted by the requesting nation merely based on his race, religion, nationality, or 
political opinions, or will be 'prejudiced at trial or restricted in his liberty because of the 
same. The "clear and longstanding" definition of a political offense recognizes a polit­
ical offense to be an "'act[ 1committed in the course of and incidental to a violent 
political disturbance such as war, revolution or rebellion.'" Koskotas v. Roche, 740 F. 
Supp 904, 911 (D. Mass. 1990) (quoting Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 518 (7th Cir. 
1981)); see also Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502, 511 (1896). See generally Gosser, supra 
note 6, at 636-40 (discussing the history and case law surrounding the political offense 
exception); M. Cherif Bassiouni, The "Political Offense Exception" Revisited: Extradi­
tion Between the U.S. and the U.K.-A Choice Between Friendly Cooperation Among 
Allies and Sound Law and Policy, 15 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 255 (1987) (explaining 
changes to the political offense exception in the treaty at issue in Kirby). 
35. See Collins v. Loisel, 262 U.S. 426 (1923) (holding that an extradition pro­
ceeding that ends in the potential extraditee's release from custody does not bar a sub­
sequent extradition demand on the same charge); In re Requested Extradition of 
Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 128 (2d Cir. 1981) ("The foreign government that is dissatisfied 
with the results 'of the hearing must institute a new request for extradition. "). Multiple 
requests for the extradition of the accused must, however, be filed in good faith. See 
Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d 1360, 1366 (9th Cir. 1978). 
36. See Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1101 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating 
that habeas corpus review of an extradition decision is limited to "'whether the magis­
trate had jurisdiction, whether the offense charged is within the treaty and, by a some­
what liberal extension, whether there was any evidence warranting the finding that 
there was reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty''') (quoting Fernandez v. 
Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925)); see also Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 901 (2d 
Cir. 1973) (recognizing that the magistrate's decision is not appealable, but that the 
extraditee may obtain review by"way of a writ of habeas corpus). See generally, BAS­
SIOUNI, supra note 23, at 737-49; Hall, supra note 23, at 603. Black's Law Dictionary 
defines habeas corpus ad subjiciendum as: 
A writ directed to the person detaining another, and commanding him to pro­
duce the body of the prisoner, or person detained. This is the most common 
form of habeas corpus writ, the purpose of which is to test the legality of the 
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that made the decision to extradite will certify its decision to the 
Secretary of State, who exercises discretionary review of extradition 
decisions.37 Following the certification for extradition, the Secre­
tary of State can order the surrender of the accused.38 If surrender 
does not occur within two months of certification for extradition, 
the accused may be released.39 
2. Bail Decisions During the Extradition Process 
Currently, there are no statutory provisions concerning bail in 
extradition cases.40 Rather, the United States Supreme Court, in 
detention or the imprisonment; not whether he is guilty or innocent. This writ 
is guaranteed by the U.S. Const. Art. I, § 9, and by state constitutions. 
BLACK'S LAW DIGnONARY 709-10 (6th ed. 1990). 
37. See 18 U.S.c. §§ 3184, 3186 (1994 & Supp. II 1996); see also Escobedo, 623 
F.2d at 1105 & n.20 (stating that a fugitive is not generally entitled to review by the 
Secretary of State on the propriety of the extradition, but that the Secretary of State 
always has discretion to refuse to extradite); Collier v. Vaccaro, 51 F.2d 17, 20 (4th Cir. 
1931) ("Notwithstanding the discharge of the writ [of habeas corpus], the Secretary of 
State may review the evidence before the magistrate and decide whether the case 
presented is one calling for the surrender of the accused to [foreign authorities]."). Typ­
ically, the Secretary of State will not deny extradition. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 23, at 
776; see also Hall, supra note 23, at 603 & n.25; Note, Executive Discretion in Extradi­
tion,62 COLUM. L. REv. 1313, 1328-29 (1962) (noting that in the twenty-one years prior 
to 1962, the Secretary of State denied extradition after certification only twice). How­
ever, the Secretary of State may narrow the terms of the 'extradition approved by the 
magistrate. See Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 906 (2d Cir. 1973) ("[W]e have no 
doubt that the Secretary of State could, if he wished, narrow the terms of extradition 
approved by the magistrate ...."). 
38. See 18 U.S.c. § 3186 (1994) ("The Secretary of State may order the person 
committed ... to be delivered to any authorized agent of such foreign government 
...."). 
39. See id. § 3188, which states: 
Whenever any person who is committed for rendition to a foreign government 
to remain until delivered up ... is not so delivered up and conveyed out of the 
United States within two calendar months after such commitment ... any 
judge of the United States, or of any State, upon application made to him by 
or on behalf of the person so committed ... may order the person so commit­
ted to be discharged out of custody . . . . 
Id.; see also In re Extradition of Barrett, 590 F.2d 624, 626 (6th Cir. 1978) (agreeing with 
the district court that the two month time period begins to run when the order commit­
ting the extraditee to jail to wait for extradition is entered, but also recognizing that the 
enforcement language of the statute is not in mandatory terms). 
40. See In re Extradition of Rovelli, 977 F. Supp. 566, 567 (D. Conn. 1997) (rely­
ing on Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40 (1903), for the power to grant bail in special cir­
cumstances); In re Extradition of Sutton, 898 F. Supp. 691, 693-94 (E.D. Mo. 1995) 
(recognizing that federal statutes governing extradition do not include a bail provision, 
that the Bail Reform Act does not apply to international extradition cases, and that 
courts must instead rely on federal common law); see also Nathaniel A. Persily, Note, 
International Extradition and the Right to Bail, 34 STAN. J. INT'L L. 407 (1998) (explain­
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Wright v. Henkel,41 vested the power to grant bail in international 
extradition cases with the courtS.42 The standard set forth by the 
Court in Wright v. Henkel allows bail requests to be granted in in­
ternational extradition cases only where "special circumstances" 
exist.43 
ing the development of the right to bail in international extradition cases and arguing 
that federal legislation should be used to clarify the federal courts' power to grant bail). 
41. 190 U.S. 40 (1903). 
42. See id. at 63 ("[W]e are unwilling to hold that the Circuit Courts possess no 
power in respect of admitting to bail other than as specifically vested by statute, or that, 
while bail should not ordinarily be granted in cases of foreign extradition, those courts 
may not in any case, and whatever the special circumstances, extend that relief."); In re 
Mitchell, 171 F. 289, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1909) (stating that the power to grant bail should be 
exercised only in "most pressing circumstances"); see also Kester, supra note 34, at 
1447-50 (debunking the myth that bail is not available in international extradition 
cases). 
Many times a magistrate judge presides over extradition hearings, including ruling 
or adopting findings on the issue of whether bail should be granted. See In re Extradi­
tion of Russell, 805 F.2d 1215, 1216 (5th Cir. 1986) (denying bail); In re Extradition of 
Morales, 906 F. Supp. 1368, 1370 (S.D. Cal. 1995) (same); In re Extradition of Sidali, 
868 F. Supp. 656, 659 (D.N.I. 1994) (same); In re Extradition of Heilbronn, 773 F. Supp. 
1576, 1576, 1582 (W.D. Mich. 1991) (same). But see United States v. Taitz, 130 F.R.D. 
442, 443 (S.D. Cal. 1990) (admitting bail). 
43. See Wright, 190 U.S. at 63; see also Salerno v. United States, 878 F.2d 317, 317 
(9th Cir. 1989) ("Examples of such circumstances include the raising of substantial 
claims upon which the appellant [extraditee] has a high probability of success [in avoid­
ing extradition], a serious deterioration of health while incarcerated, and unusual delay 
in the appeal process."); Hu Yau-Leung v. Soscia, 649 F.2d 914, 920 (2d Cir. 1981) 
(finding special circumstances and granting bail where the extraditee was a juvenile and 
no suitable holding facility could be found); Morales, 906 F. Supp. at 1374-75 (finding 
special circumstances and granting bail when, after being held for six months, the 
United States dismissed the original complaint at the request of the foreign govern­
ment, and then filed a new complaint, thereby delaying conclusion of the matter); Taitz, 
130 F.R.D. at 445-47 (finding special circumstances and granting bail where the absence 
of flight risk was added to the need for lengthy hearings, the lack of a criminal record, 
severe allergies that would be adversely affected by custody, an inability to carry out 
religious rituals at the correctional facility, and a lack of diplomatic necessity for deny­
ing bail). 
The "special circumstances" standard is relatively strict. See In re Extradition of 
Mainero, 950 F. Supp. 290, 294 (S.D. Cal. 1996) ("A person subject to international 
extradition may overcome the presumption against bail by presenting clear and con­
vincing evidence demonstrating 'special circumstances' justifying release ....") (quot­
ing In re Extradition of Nacif-Borge, 829 F. Supp. 1210, 1215 (D. Nev. 1993»; In re 
Mitchell, 171 F. at 289 (stating that the power to grant bail "should be exercised only in 
the most pressing circumstances," as in this case where the extraditee was arrested on 
the eve of a civil case involving his entire fortune). As a result, many times courts deny 
bail when the circumstances are not deemed special enough to warrant bail. See, e.g., 
United States v. Kin-Hong, 83 F.3d 523, 524-25 (1st Cir. 1996) (stating that the record 
does not establish either probability of success or likelihood of protracted extradition 
proceedings due to impending change in sovereignty in Hong Kong); In Re Extradition 
of Russell, 805 F.2d at 1217 (denying bail despite pending civil litigation, complexity of 
the pending extradition proceedings, criminal trial in Columbia, no risk of flight, and 
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When a bail request is denied either by a magistrate or a judge, 
the potential extraditee may seek release through the use of a writ 
of habeas corpus.44 Conversely, when a bail request is granted, if it 
is granted by a magistrate as opposed to a district court judge, ap­
peal by the United States on behalf of the requesting country lies to 
the district court.45 However, if the bail request is granted by a 
district court judge, the United States, acting on behalf of the re-
potentially severe financial and emotional hardship on extraditee and his family); 
United States v. Leitner, 784 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 1986) (denying bail despite slow 
arrest by treaty parties, where potential extraditee had already been detained for one 
month and was entitled to his liberty after sixty days of detainment absent proper docu­
mentation and requirements for extradition); United States v. Williams, 611 F.2d 914, 
915 (1st Cir. 1979) (denying bail notwithstanding the fact that the accused's brother, 
who faced an extradition hearing on the same charge, was released in another district); 
In re Extradition of Rovelli, 977 F. Supp. at 569-70 (denying bail notwithstanding the 
fact that Swiss authorities chose not to extradite the extraditee's mother on a similar 
charge, the extraditee claimed a need to consult with his attorneys, and the extraditee's 
willingness to convert his home into a secure detention facility and wear an electronic 
monitoring device); In re Extradition of Sutton, 898 F. Supp. at 694-95 (denying bail 
despite delay, lack of risk of flight, and fact that offense was bailable in the country 
requesting extradition); In re Extradition of Siegmund, 887 F. Supp. 1383, 1386-87 (D. 
Nev. 1995) (denying bail despite no flight risk, bailable offense in requesting country, 
nature of offense [fraudulent bankruptcy], and possibility that extraditee was in custody 
for ninety days while awaiting extradition); In re Extradition of Sidali, 868 F. Supp. at 
658-59 (denying bail after finding that probability of success in avoiding extradition at 
hearing and extraordinary personal character were outweighed by the gravity of the 
offense); In re Extradition of Rouvier, 839 F. Supp. 537, 541-42 (N.D. III. 1993) (deny­
ing bail notwithstanding current ties to United States, heart condition, no risk of flight, 
claim that statements made to American court regarding extraditee's foreign criminal 
action were false, and extraditee's compliance with all required legal procedures when 
he left France); In re Extradition of Hamilton-Byrne, 831 F. Supp. 287, 290-91 
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (denying bail despite health problems that were not so unique that 
they could not be dealt with in custody); In re Extradition of Heilbronn, 773 F. Supp. at 
1581-82 (denying bail despite no flight risk, delay allegedly caused by Israel, and release 
would benefit the public because extraditee is a doctor); United States v. Hills, 765 F. 
Supp. 381, 386-88 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (disallowing bail despite absence of flight risk, 
extraditee's involvement in civil litigation, need to assist his attorney, and constitutional 
and procedural defenses raised at extradition hearing); Koskotas v. Roche, 740 F. Supp. 
904, 908 (D. Mass. 1990) (disallowing bail despite extraditee's need to be involved in 
counsel's preparation for extradition proceedings, ongoing pro se defense in civil action 
in New York that involved most of his assets, and extraditee's willingness to submit 
himself to house arrest). 
44. See Leitner, 784 F.2d at 160 (affirming the decision of the district court to 
deny habeas relief after magistrate granted bail); Koskotas, 740 F. Supp. at 919 (denying 
habeas relief after magistrate denied bail). 
45. See In re Extradition of Rouvier, 839 F. Supp. at 537 (hearing emergency 
motion brought by the United States Attorney when the magistrate granted bail). This 
Note does not address whether United States District Courts may hear appeals from 
grants of bail by United States magistrates. Rather, the analysis in this Note is confined 
to the issue of whether grants of bail by the district courts are reviewable by the courts 
of appeals. 
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questing nation, has no avenue to obtain review of the bail decision 
unless jurisdiction exists in the courts of appeals.46 
In domestic criminal cases, as opposed to international extradi­
tion cases, appellate review of grants of bail was not available until 
jurisdiction was conferred by federal statute. An examination of 
the availability of appellate review of bail decisions in domestic 
criminal cases will prove helpful in understanding this Note's final 
analysis. 
B. 	 Review of Grants of Bail in Domestic Criminal Cases 
In domestic criminal cases, appellate review of district court 
decisions is conferred by federal statute. Although uncommon, 
parties in domestic criminal cases may invoke the jurisdiction pro­
vided by 28 U.S.c. § 1291.47 More frequently, the government 
takes criminal appeals pursuant to the Criminal Appeals Act, 18 
U.S.c. 	§ 3731.48 
The provision of § 3731 that is most germane to the issue of 
46. See United States v. Kirby, 106 F.3d 855, 858 (9th Cir. 1996) (explaining that 
there is no Supreme Court precedent determining the issue of whether the United 
States has the right to appeal from a district court order granting bail). 
47. 28 U.S.c. § 1291 (1994). See infra Part 1.C.1 through Part 1.C.2 for a detailed 
discussion of § 1291. 
48. 	 18 U.S.c. § 3731 (1994). Section 3731 provides the following: 
In a criminal case an appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of 
appeals from a decision, judgment, or order of a district court dismissing an 
indictment or information or granting a new trial after verdict or judgment, as 
to anyone or more counts, except that no appeal shall lie where the double 
jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution prohibits further 
prosecution. 
An appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a 
decision or order of a district court suppressing or excluding evidence or re­
quiring the return of seized property in a criminal proceeding, not made after 
the defendant has been put in jeopardy and before the verdict or finding on an 
indictment or information, if the United States attorney certifies to the district 
court that the appeal is not taken for purpose of delay and that the evidence is 
a substantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding. 
An appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a deci­
sion or order, entered by a district court of the United States, granting the release 
of a person charged with or convicted of an offense, or denying a motion for 
revocation of, or modification of the conditions of, a decision or order granting 
release. 
The appeal in all such cases shall be taken within thirty days after the 
decision, judgment or order has been rendered and shall be diligently 
prosecuted. 
The provisions of this section shall be liberally construed to effectuate its 
purposes. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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whether bail decisions made by district judges in international ex­
tradition cases may be reviewed provides the government with the 
right to appeal an adverse bail decision, i.e. one that releases the 
defendant on bail, made by a district court judge in a domestic 
criminal case.49 When the bail decision is made in a domestic crimi­
nal case by a magistrate, or by any person other than a judge of the 
court having original jurisdiction, not including a federal appellate 
court, the government's right to appeal is set forth in 18 U.S.c. 
§ 3145.50 
Since there is no parallel statutory provision that provides the 
government with the right to appeal an adverse bail ruling in an 
international extradition matter, if jurisdiction is to lie, it must be 
found elsewhere. Hence, an inquiry into the jurisdictional require­
ment the United States must meet in order to obtain review by the 
courts of appeals is necessary. 
C. 	 Jurisdiction of the United States Courts of Appeals 
The basic jurisdictional provisions for the federal courts of ap­
peals are presently found within 28 U.S.c. § 1291, which embodies 
the finality requirement, also known as the "final judgment rule. "51 
Section 1291 states that "[t]he courts of appeals ... shall have juris­
diction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courtS."52 
The following section describes the history of the finality require­
ment now found in § 1291. 
1. 	 History of the Jurisdiction Granted to the Courts 
of Appeals 
The final judgment rule originated ill English common law 
49. 	 See id. 
50. 18 V.S.c. § 3145 (1994). The relevant provision of § 3145 provides the 
following: 
(a) REVIEW OF A RELEASE ORDER-If a person is ordered re­
leased by a magistrate, or by a person other than a judge of a court having 
original jurisdiction over the offense and other than a Federal appellate 
court­
(1) the attorney for the Government may file, with the court having origi­
nal jurisdiction over the offense, a motion for revocation of the order or 
amendment of the conditions of release; and 
(2) the person may file, with the court having original jurisdiction over 
the offense, a motion for amendment of the conditions of release. 
Id. 
51. 28 V.S.c. § 1291 (1994); see also Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 
HARV. L. REv. 351, 353 (1961) (describing finality requirement of § 1291). 
52. 	 28 V.S.c. § 1291 (1994). 
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where a writ of error53 would provide for review, but only of a final 
decision.54 The Judiciary Act of 1789, which established the United 
States federal court system, introduced the final judgment rule into 
the American federal court system. 55 Three sections of the Judici­
ary Act contained the language of finality now found in § 1291.56 
53. A writ of error is: 
A writ issued from a court of appellate jurisdiction, directed to the judge or 
judges of a court of record, requiring them to remit to the appellate court the 
record of an action before them, in which a final judgment has been entered, 
in order that examination may be made of certain errors alleged to have been 
committed, and that the judgment may be reversed, corrected, or affirmed, as 
the case may require. 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1610 (6th ed. 1990); see also Winchester v. Winn, 29 S.W.2d 
188, 190 (Mo. 1930) ("The suing out of a writ of error is the commencement of a new 
suit to annul and set aside the judgment of the court below and is not a continuation of 
the suit below to which it relates."). 
54. See 15A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE­
DURE § 3906 (2d ed. 1992); Robert J. Martineau, Defining Finality and Appealability by 
Court Rule: Right Problem, Wrong Solution, 54 U. PITT. L. REv. 717, 726-29 (1993) 
("[T]hat the Americans borrowed the final judgment rule from the English writ of error 
procedure is a virtual certainty."). 
55. See Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). The final judgment rule as em­
bodied in the Judiciary Act of 1789 can be traced to the English common law where a 
final decision on an entire matter had to be obtained before appellate review could be 
had in the form of the writ of error. See McLish v. Roff, 141 U.S. 661 (1891). In 
McLish, Justice Lamar stated, "[i]t is true that the Judiciary Act of 1789 limited the 
appellate jurisdiction of this court to final judgments and decrees, in the cases specified. 
This, however, in respect to writs of error was only declaratory of a well settled and 
ancient rule of English practice." Id. at 665. In fact, the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided 
for review on writ of error directly to the Supreme Court of "final decrees" in maritime 
and admiralty cases from federal circuit courts. See Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 
§§ 21-22; see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 54, § 3906, at 264 (explaining the origin of 
the final judgment rule); Carleton M. Crick, The Final Judgment as A Basis for Appeal, 
41 YALE L.J. 539, 540-44 (1932) (same). See generally Charles Warren, New Light on 
the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARv. L. REv. 49 (1923), for a 
discussion of the legislative process that enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789. 
56. See Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). The three sections state: 
[Section 21: F]rom final decrees in a district court in causes of admiralty and 
maritime jurisdiction, where the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of 
three hundred dollars, exclusive of costs, an appeal shall be allowed to the 
next circuit court .... 
[Section 22: F]inal decrees and judgments in civil actions in a district court, 
where the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of fifty dollars, exclusive 
of costs, may be re-examined, and reversed or affirmed in a circuit court ... 
upon a writ of error ... [a]nd upon a like process, may final judgments and 
decrees in civil actions, and suits in equity in a circuit court ... where the 
matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of two thousand dollars, exclusive 
of costs, be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court .... 
[Section 25: A] final judgment or decree in any suit, in the highest court of law 
or equity of a State in which a decision in the suit could be had ... may be re­
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These three sections provided the ability to appeal a district court 
decision to the circuit court or Supreme Court, but only from a "fi­
nal decree" in admiralty, or a "final judgment" or "final decree" in 
law or equity.57 The legislative history surrounding the period in 
which the Judiciary Act was adopted is limited; consequently, the 
Framers' reasons for limiting the federal courts' jurisdiction in this 
way are unclear. 58 
In 1891, the Evarts Act created the federal courts of appeals.59 
Similar to the judiciary Act's grant of jurisdiction, the Evarts Act 
granted power to the newly created courts of appeals to review "by 
appeal or writ of error final decision[ s] in the district court. "60 The 
Supreme Court declared that the different terminology, "judgments 
and decrees" as used in the Judiciary Act and "decisions" as used in 
the Evarts Act, amounted to the same restriction on appellate juris­
diction.61 Currently, the finality requirement is codified in 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.62 The following section describes the difficulty the 
examined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United States 
upon a writ of error .... 
Id. 
57. See id. 
58. See 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 46 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789). Reports of the 
debates surrounding the establishment of the court system are very sparse. For exam­
ple, one report states only that "Mr. Lee, on behalf of the committee therein appointed, 
reported a bill to establish the judicial courts of the United States." Id. Another re­
port, mirroring others in terms of meagerness, states "[p]roceeded to the second read­
ing of the bill to establish the judicial courts of the United States; and, after progress, 
adjourned." Id. at 47. See generally WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 54, § 3906, at 264 
("History provides clear sources for the final judgment requirement, and no clear justi­
fication. As a result, history furnishes little useful guide for understanding or applying 
the requirement today."); Crick, supra note 55, at 548-49 (commenting on sparseness of 
legislative history); Warren, supra note 55, at 49 (explaining that the legislative history 
from this period is sparse, thereby rendering the Framers' reasons for limiting the 
courts of appeals' jurisdiction elusive). 
59. See Evarts Act, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891). Section 2 of this Act created the 
federal courts of appeals and provided for the appointment of an additional circuit 
judge in each circuit. See id. § 2. The newly created courts of appeals were to be com­
posed of three judges who would be drawn from the existing judgeships. See id. The 
Judicial Code of 1911 formally abolished the old circuit courts. See Act of March 3, 
1911, ch. 231, § 289, 36 Stat. 1087, 1167. The Judicial Code also provided for judgeships 
so that the newly created courts of appeals would be staffed with its own judges. See id. 
§ 118. 
60. See Evarts Act, 26 Stat. at 828, § 6. 
61. See Ex parte Tiffany, 252 U.S. 32, 36 (1920). In Ex parte Tiffany, the Supreme 
Court stated "[t]he words: 'final decisions in the district courts' mean the same thing as 
'final judgments and decrees' as used in former acts regulating appellate jurisdiction." 
Id. 
62. 28 U.S.c. § 1291 (1994). 
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courts have encountered when interpreting the finality 
requirement. 
2. Defining the Finality Requirement 
Discussing the problem of defining the finality required by 
§ 1291, the Supreme Court63 has noted that the cases on finality 
"are not altogether harmonious."64 While the language of finality 
had been around for some time, it was not until 1945 that the 
Supreme Court, in Catlin v. United States ,65 offered a general defini­
tion of a final decision.66 The Supreme Court proclaimed that a 
final decision is "one which ends the litigation on the merits and 
leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment."67 
With this authoritative judicial pronouncement, the Court appeared 
to have defined finality.68 
Nevertheless, the Court eschewed its own definition whenever 
necessary to reach the desired result. For example, in Cohen v. 
63. Many of the opinions that attempt to define finality are found in cases where 
a party is seeking Supreme Court review of a state court decision. Jurisdiction over 
these claims, pursuant to 28 U.S.c. § 1257, also hinges on finality. See 28 U.S.c. § 1257 
(1994) ("Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State ... may be 
reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari. ..."). However, the Supreme 
Court apparently considers a "final judgment" to be the same in either § 1257 cases or 
§ 1291 cases, and the Supreme Court often interchanges precedents which have at­
tempted to define this requirement. See, e.g., Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 
478 n.7 (1975) (determining whether a state court decision was final for purposes of 
appeal and citing decisions concerning finality of district court decisions for review by 
courts of appeals); Local No. 438 Constr. & Gen. Laborers' Union v. Curry, 371 U.S. 
542,549 (1963) (same); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 309-11 (1962) 
(determining what constituted a final judgment within the meaning of the Expediting 
Act and citing two cases concerning appeals to the courts of appeals under § 1291, and a 
third concerning an appeal to the Supreme Court under § 1257). 
64. See McGourkey v. Toledo & Ohio Cent. Ry. Co., 146 U.S. 536, 545 (1892); see 
also Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 370 (1920) (holding that judgment should be final as 
to all parties, causes of action, and entire subject matter involved before appeal); St. 
Louis, Iron Co. v. Southern Express Co., 108 U.S. 24, 28 (1883) (reasoning that decree 
is final for purposes of appeal when it terminates the litigation on the merits and leaves 
nothing to be done but enforce the decree). 
65. 324 U.S. 229 (1945). 
66. See id. at 233; see also Martineau, supra note 54, at 729 (noting surprise that 
the Court did not "develop a general definition of final judgment" for quite some time, 
and citing Catlin as the case that finally did). 
67. Catlin, 324 U.S. at 233. 
68. See John C. Nagel, Replacing the Crazy Quilt of Interlocutory Appeals Juris­
prudence With Discretionary Review, 44 DUKE L.J. 200, 203-04 (1994) (noting the "bat­
tle" between the competing policies for and against interlocutory appeals and 
acknowledging that the Court "settle[d] the controversy in favor of precluding interloc­
utory appeals" with the definition announced in Catlin). 
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Beneficial Loan Corp. ,69 the Supreme Court permitted the appeal 
of an order requiring the plaintiff in a stockholder's derivative suit 
to post security for the reasonable expenses of the defendant if the 
plaintiff was unsuccessful in the suit.7° Surely, this order did not fit 
into the definition set forth in Catlin; however, the Cohen Court 
relied on past cases where the finality requirement was given a 
"practical rather than technical construction" and proceeded to 
provide review.71 
In Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp.,72 the Supreme Court 
relied on Cohen and stressed that "a decision 'final' within the 
meaning of § 1291 does not necessarily mean the last order possible 
to be made in a case."73 The Court then adopted a balancing ap­
proach which required weighing the inconvenience and costs of in­
terlocutory74 review against the danger of denying justice by 
delaying the appeal until after final judgment.75 The Gillespie doc­
trine, if adhered to, could have ended much of the debate surround­
ing the final judgment rule because it gave discretion in determining 
which orders merit appellate review through the balancing test. 
However, the doctrine has been criticized.76 
Attesting to the lack of a concrete definition for "finality," the 
69. 337 U.S. 541 (1949). 
70. See id. 
71. See id. at 546 (collecting cases). 
72. 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1964) ("[W]hether a ruling is 'final' within the meaning of 
§ 1291 is frequently so close a question that decision of that issue either way can be 
supported with equally forceful arguments, and ... it is impossible to devise a formula 
to resolve all marginal cases coming within what might well be called the 'twilight zone' 
of finality."). 
73. Id. at 152 (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545 
(1949)). See, e.g., Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 658 (1977); Brown Shoe Co. v. 
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 306 (1962); Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 
U.S. 507, 511 (1950); Bronson v. LaCrosse & Milwaukie R.R., 67 U.S. (2 Black) 524, 
531 (1862); Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 203 (1848). 
74. The term interlocutory is defined as "[p]rovisional; interim; temporary; not 
final. Something intervening between the commencement and the end of a suit which 
decides some point or matter, but is not a final decision of the whole controversy." 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 815 (6th ed. 1990); see also In re Merle's Inc., 481 F.2d 1016, 
1018 (9th Cir. 1973) ("An interlocutory order or decree is one which does not finally 
determine a cause of action but only decides some intervening matter pertaining to the 
cause, and which requires further steps to be taken in order to enable the court to 
adjudicate the cause on the merits."). 
75. See Gillespie, 379 U.S. at 152-53. 
76. See Randall J. Thrk, Note, Toward a More Rational Final Judgment Rule: A 
Proposal to Amend 28 U.S.c. § 1292, 67 GEO. L.J. 1025,1034 (1979); see also Martin H. 
Redish, The Pragmatic Approach to Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. 
REv. 89, 118 (1975) ("The Court's opinion in Gillespie is astounding for its clouded 
reasoning and enigmatic conclusions. It is unfortunate that a decision which may repre­
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Supreme Court, in 1974, stated that "no verbal formula yet devised 
can explain prior finality decisions with unerring accuracy or pro­
vide an utterly reliable guide for the future."77 Yet, despite the 
problems encountered by the courts when defining finality, the fi­
nality requirement remains. Therefore, in order to better under­
stand why the finality requirement and its opposition persist, the 
following sections explain the benefits of appeals in general, the 
policies supporting the appealability of final judgments only, and 
the countervailing policies that support interlocutory appeals. 
3. The Value of Appeals in General 
Appeals serve a number of positive objectives.78 Appeals fur­
ther the goal of rendering factually and legally correct decisions by 
adding another layer of scrutiny.79 In addition, appeals contribute 
to a fairer judicial process by allowing review of the constraints 
placed on a litigant by what would otherwise be an unreviewable 
court.80 The larger debate, however, is centered around the appro­
priate time for an appeal to be taken. One viewpoint is that appeals 
should be delayed until after a final judgment has been entered, 
while the opposing viewpoint is that sometimes interlocutory ap­
peals are necessary. 
a. Policies supporting appeals after final judgment 
Despite the dissatisfaction expressed by some toward the final­
ity requirement, several policies justify its use.81 The following sec­
tion describes the policies that support the finality requirement. 
sent a truly significant adjustment of the entire philosophy of appealability is so devoid 
of any persuasive analysis."). 
77. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974). 
78. See Solimine, infra note 86, at 1175-80 (arguing that less judicial hostility to­
ward interlocutory appeals is needed because interlocutory appeals serve a number of 
positive goals). 
79. See J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Role of Reason in the Rule of Law, 56 U. 
DIl. L. REv. 779, 799 (1989) (arguing that "the justification for appeals is not necessar­
ily the 'correct' result they may produce, but their tendency to encourage reasoned 
judgment by subjecting it to reexamination"). But see Judith Resnik, Precluding Ap­
peals, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 603, 606 (1985) (quoting former United States Solicitor 
General Rex Lee "who stated that 'there is nothing in the Constitution and nothing in 
common sense that says that decisions of an appellate court are more likely to be right 
than a district court"'). 
80. See Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seri­
ously, 95 YALE L.J. 62, 66-67 (1985) (explaining that fairness manifests itself in 
appeals). 
81. See Note, supra note 51, at 351-53 (describing several policies supporting fi­
nality requirement); see also Joseph Mitzel, Note, When is an Order Final?: A Result­
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1. 	 The finality requirement helps prevent overburdened 
dockets 
While overburdened dockets may not have been a concern in 
1789 when the judiciary Act was first adopted, the finality require­
ment of § 1291 has been praised as a way of easing the burden on 
the dockets of the courts of appeals.82 The finality requirement 
reduces the number of appeals by preventing piecemeal review, 
which is the review of anyone decision in a single case before com­
pletion of the trial phase.83 Piecemeal review of each decision 
made within a single case is unnecessary because most decisions can 
be effectively reviewed after the trial phase is completed.84 When 
all of the issues are then reviewed in one appeal, the number of 
appeals overall will decline. Consequently, the burden on the dock­
ets of the appellate courts is lessened. 
n. 	 The finality requirement promotes judicial efficiency 
The concern with piecemeal review during the era in which the 
Judiciary Act was enacted centered around administrative difficul-
Oriented Approach to the Finality Requirement for Bankruptcy Appeals to Federal Cir­
cuit Courts, 74 MINN. L. REv. 1337,1341-42 (1990) (same). 
82. Guarding against overburdening was not one of the main concerns in England 
at the time the rule came into existence. In fact, it was not until 1830 that the United 
States Supreme Court began to acknowledge the rule for this purpose. Justice Story, in 
Canter v. American Insurance Co., 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 307 (1830), stated: 
It is of great importance to the due administration of justice, and is in further­
ance of the manifest intention of the legislature, in giving appellate jurisdiction 
to this court upon final decrees only, that causes should not come up here in 
fragments, upon successive appeals. It would occasion very great delays, and 
oppressive expenses. 
Id. at 318. 
The Canter Court then found that since the circuit court did not address damages, 
and the party seeking damages did not cross appeal, this issue was "not now open 
before this court." Id.; see also Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 205 (1848) 
(stating that "it was obviously the object of the law to save the unnecessary expense and 
delay of repeated appeals in the same suit"); United States v. Bailey, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 
267,273 (1835) (finding that repeated appeals would waste resources and cause delay 
and noting that "Congress did not intend to expose suitors to this inconvenience"). See 
generally Crick, supra note 55, at 544, 550. 
83. This is especially true in light of the fact that subsequent rulings may moot the 
requirement of appeal. For example, if a party that would have appealed a ruling then 
wins the case, he no longer needs the appeal to vindicate his rights. See Stringfellow v. 
Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 380 (1987); see also WRIGHT ET AL., 
supra note 54, § 3907, at 273-74. 
84. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 54, § 3907, at 272; see also Gillespie v. United 
States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152-53 (1964) (balancing "the inconvenience and costs 
of piecemeal review ... and the danger of denying justice by delay"). 
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ties, as opposed to overburdened dockets.85 Today, the finality re­
quirement increases efficiency in the judicial system by eliminating 
the delays that would occur if every ruling was subject to interlocu­
tory review.86 In addition, the finality requirement aids judicial effi­
ciency by ensuring that the appellate court receives a full record, as 
opposed to one which is not yet complete.87 Also, the finality re­
quirement increases judicial efficiency by keeping counsel as well as 
the court familiar with the case because the chance of interruptions 
for appeals is diminished.88 Furthermore, the finality requirement 
promotes efficiency because it decreases the possibility of mis­
placed evidence, which could occur if piecemeal review were 
undertaken.89 
111. The finality requirement enhances the judicial process 
In addition to easing the burden on the courts' dockets and 
increasing judicial efficiency, the finality requirement enhances the 
judicial process. A common criticism of interlocutory appeals is 
that such appeals decrease respect for the trial judge.90 The finality 
requirement lowers the number of interlocutory appeals, thus en­
85. See Crick, supra note 55, at 541-43 (discussing the problems of having the 
"record" in two separate courts at the same time). 
86. See Gillespie, 379 U.S. at 152-53 (stating that there is a "danger of denying 
justice by delay"); Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 234 (1945) (stating that elimina­
tion of delay caused by interlocutory review is reason enough to sustain final judgment 
limitation); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 
504 (3d ed. 1976) (stating that "[i]nterlocutory appeals add to the delay of litigation"); 
Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts, 58 GEO. 
WASH. L. REv. 1165, 1179 (1990) (stating that "permitting more interlocutory appeals 
will indeed cause delay of the proceedings"). 
87. See Crick, supra note 55, at 541-43; see also Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 
309 (1995) (noting that interlocutory appeal "risks additional, and unnecessary, appel­
late court work ... when it presents appellate courts with less developed records"); 
Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 147 U.S. 337, 341 (1893) (stating "[t]he case is not to 
be sent up in fragments"); Note, supra note 51, at 352 ("A single appeal consolidating 
all alleged errors also minimizes the appellate court burden by eliminating more than 
one set of records, briefs and arguments."). 
88. See Mitzel, supra note 81, at 1342. 
89. See id. at 1341-42. 
90. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981) ("Per­
mitting piecemeal appeals would undermine the independence of the district judge, as 
well as the special role that individual plays in our judicial system."); Riyaz A. Kanji, 
The Proper Scope of Pendent Appellate Jurisdiction in the Collateral Order Context, 100 
YALE L.J. 511, 512 (1990) ("The constant specter of such review would reduce the dis­
trict judge to a token figure."); Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial 
Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 635, 661 (1971); Charles A. Wright, 
The DOUbtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751, 779-80 (1957). 
But see Paul D. Carrington, The Power o/District Judges and the Responsibility of 
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suring continued respect for the trial judge. The finality require­
ment also enhances the judicial process by highlighting the trial 
judge as the decision-maker when issues arise at trial.91 The finality 
requirement further enhances the judicial process by safeguarding 
poorer opponents from harassment by richer opponents, who can 
afford to take endless appeals.92 
Despite the many policies supporting the finality requirement, 
interlocutory appeals also prove beneficial and serve valuable pur­
poses. The following section sets forth the benefits of interlocutory 
appeals. 
b. Policies supporting interlocutory appeals 
Interlocutory appeals provide review of decisions that will 
meld into the final judgment and will be effectively unreviewable, 
such as a denial of removal to state court or a refusal to grant sum­
mary judgment.93 Furthermore, interlocutory appeals aid courts of 
appeals in supervising trial court actions that may not be reviewable 
on an appeal from a final judgment.94 In light of the above policies, 
several mechanisms that provide for interlocutory appeals have 
been created. These mechanisms circumvent the final judgment 
rule toward the end of allowing interlocutory review. An under­
standing of these mechanisms is essential to a proper determination 
of whether bail decisions in international extradition cases may be 
reviewed. The following section describes mechanisms for ob­
taining interlocutory review which, by their very nature, bypass the 
final judgment rule. 
Courts ofAppeals, 3 GA. L. REv. 507, 513 (1969) ("Only a venal or unduly timid judge 
should fear or regret review, insofar as the esteem of his office is concerned."). 
91. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 449 U.S. at 374 ("[The finality requirement] 
emphasizes the deference that appellate courts owe to the trial judge as the individual 
initially called upon to decide the many questions of law and fact that occur in the 
course of a trial."). 
92. See Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940) (recognizing that 
the finality requirement is a way of "avoid[ing] the obstruction to just claims that would 
come from permitting the harassment and cost of a succession of separate appeals from 
the various rulings to which a litigation may give rise, from its initiation to entry of 
judgment"); see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 54, § 3907, at 272; Wright, supra note 
90, at 780 (arguing that an injured person of limited means may settle for a smaller 
recovery of damages rather than wait for an appeal to be determined). 
93. See Redish, supra note 76, at 98 (explaining that a litigant may be substan­
tially burdened physically, financially, and emotionally in the preparation and conduct 
of a trial if review, which might negate the need for that trial, is delayed). 
94. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 374, 411 (1982) (ex­
plaining that a judge who assumes a managerial role exercises broad discretion, en­
joying unreviewable discretion in most decisions). 
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4. 	 Avenues of Review Which Circumvent the Finality 
Requirement95 
The following section is comprised of sub-sections that de­
scribe avenues of review that circumvent the finality requirement 
including: (a) 28 U.S.c. § 1292, (b) Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, (c) the collateral order doctrine, and (d) the All 
Writs Act. 
a. 	 Section 1292 
Section 1292 of Title 28 of the United States Code, created by 
the Interlocutory Appeals Act, consists of several provisions that 
provide for interlocutory appellate review.96 Section 1292(a)(1) 
grants jurisdiction to the courts of appeals over orders of district 
courts relating to injunctive relief.97 The Supreme Court has lim­
ited this section, despite its expansive appearance.98 Similarly, 
§ 1292(a)(2) and (3) grant jurisdiction over appeals of interlocutory 
95. Other avenues of obtaining interlocutory review that are not discussed in­
depth in this Note include: the Forgay-Conrad rule, the appeal of attorney fees orders, 
the appeal of bankruptcy orders, the death knell doctrine, the appeal of stay orders, and 
provisions set forth in the Federal Arbitration Act that are now codified at 9 U.S.c. 
§ 16 (1994). See Martineau, supra note 54, at 734-46. The Forgay-Conrad rule allows 
appeals when a court orders a transfer of property, yet retains jurisdiction for 
accounting purposes. See Forgay v. Conrad 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 204 (1848). The 
Supreme Court adopted a rule separating appealability of attorney fees from 
appealability of final judgment on the merits orders in Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & 
Co., 486 U.S. 196,202 (1988). Appeals of bankruptcy orders are governed by 28 U.S.c. 
§'158(d) (1994), which provides jurisdiction to courts of appeals over "all final 
decisions, judgments, orders, and decrees" entered by district courts. However, the 
courts use a flexible approach providing for appeals from non-final orders. See 
Martineau, supra note 54, at 745-46. In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury 
Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983), the Supreme Court set forth a narrow exception 
to the final judgment rule such that any stay of a federal case pending resolution of state 
court proceedings is immediately appealable. See id. at 10. Since both the federal and 
the state claim involved the same issue, the plaintiff would have been barred from the 
federal court by res judicata, and as a result would never have been able to pursue the 
federal claim. See id. Finally, § 16 provides for immediate appeal from an interlocutory 
order that does not favor arbitration. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.c. § 16 (1994). 
96. 	 Interlocutory Appeals Act, 28 U.S.c. § 1292 (1994). 
97. See id. § 1292(a)(1). The text of § 1292(a)(1) states that courts of appeals 
shall have jurisdiction over "[i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts ... granting, 
continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or mod­
ify injunctions, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court ...." 
Id. 
98. See Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79 (1981) (holding that for an 
interlocutory appeal to be immediately appealable under § 1292(a)(1), a litigant must 
show that the order might have serious, perhaps irreparable, consequences and can only 
be effectively challenged by immediate appeal); Switzerland Cheese Assoc. v. E. 
Home's Mkt., Inc., 385 U.S. 23 (1966) (holding that an order denying summary judg­
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orders that appoint receivers or refuse to wind up receiverships, 
and over decrees in admiralty cases.99 However, § 1292(a)(2) and 
(3) do not provide the basis for a significant number of interlocu­
tory appeals. lOO 
In addition to § 1292(a) and its sub-parts, § 1292(b) provides 
for discretionary review by the courts of appeals of orders that are 
deemed by a district court judge to involve "a controlling question 
of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opin­
ion" the resolution of which, in an immediate appeal, "may materi­
ally advance the termination of the litigation."I01 Courts of appeals 
may permit an appeal from an order of this type only if an "applica­
tion is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order."I02 In 
addition, the application for such appeal "shall not stay proceedings 
in the district court unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals 
or a judge thereof shall so order."lo3 Although appearing to pro­
vide for many interlocutory appeals, § 1292(b) has been construed· 
very strictly, and as a result, is not often the basis for interlocutory 
review,l04 
Section 1292(c) and (d) do not-provide means for obtaining 
interlocutory review by the courts of appeals despite the final judg­
ment rule.lOS Rather, they describe the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the process of appealing pro­
ceedings from the Court of International Trade or the Claims Court 
to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.106 Since § 1292(c) 
and (9) do not concern the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals to 
review bail decisions in international extradition cases, they are not 
helpful in resolving this issue. Section 1292(e),I07 on the other 
ment, though argued by the plaintiff to be a denial of a permanent injunction, was not 
appealable within § 1292(a)(1». 
99. See 28 U.S.c. § 1292(a)(2)-(3) (1994). 
100. See Martineau, supra note 54, at 732. 
101. 28 U.S.c. § 1292(b) (1994). 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. See Hewitt v. Joyce Beverages, Inc., 721 F.2d 625, 627 (7th Cir. 1983) (criti­
cizing a district court that certified an order for appeal and strongly recommending that 
future district courts adhere to the language of § 1292(b) when certifying); cf In re 
Hamilton, 122 F.3d 13, 14 (7th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that literal repetition of the statu­
tory criteria in the district court's order of certification is not required, but also stating 
that it would be a great help ... if the district court, whenever it certifies a case for an 
immediate appeal under § 1292(b), explained why it thinks the case satisfies the statu­
tory criteria) (citations omitted). 
105. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)-(d) (1994). 
106. See id. 
107. See id. § 1292(e). 
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hand, adds an interesting provision that might aid in resolving the 
controversy over which decisions are appealable. 
Section 1292(e) states that "[t]he Supreme Court may pre­
scribe rules, in accordance with section 2072108 of this title, to pro­
vide for an appeal of an interlocutory decision to the courts of 
appeals that is not otherwise provided for under subsection (a), (b), 
(c), or (d)."109 Congress added § 1292(e) when it enacted the Fed­
eral Courts Administration Act of 1992 and thereby gave the 
Supreme Court the power to create new categories of interlocutory 
appeals pursuant to its rule-making power.110 
The Supreme Court first received rule-making power to define 
a "final decision" within § 1291 when Congress amended the above­
mentioned § 2072 of the Rules Enabling Act111 and added subsec­
tion (c) as part of the Federal Courts Study Implementation Act of 
1990.112 The Rules Enabling Act grants the Supreme Court the 
power to make rules pertaining to practice, procedure, and evi­
dence in the district courts and courts of appeals, so long as such 
rules do not "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right."113 
Subsection (c) of the Rules Enabling Act provides that "[s]uch rules 
may define when a ruling of a district court is final for purposes of 
appeal under section 1291 of this title."114 While the Supreme 
Court has been given the power, through the enactment of 
§§ 1292( e) and 2072 ( c), to prescribe rules that could clarify the fi­
nality requirement, the Supreme Court has not yet exercised this 
power.115 Notwithstanding this new power, § 1292 provides but one 
of a number of different ways to obtain interlocutory review in spite 
of the final judgment rule. 
b. Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
In a multiple party or claim lawsuit, Rule 54(b) furnishes an 
avenue to appellate review even though the trial phase is not yet 
108. See infra notes 111-114 and accompanying text for the language of § 2072 of 
the Rules Enabling Act. 
109. 28 U.S.c. § 1292(e) (1994). 
110. See Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 101, 
106 Stat. 4506. 
111. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994). 
112. Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 315, 104 Stat. 5104, 5115 (1990). 
113. 28 U.S.c. § 2072(a)-(b) (1994). 
114. Id. § 2072(c). 
115. See Nagel, supra note 68, at 213-14 ("To date, however, the rulemakers have 
yet to exercise their powers under either section 1292(e) or section 2072(c)."). 
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complete.116 Rule 54(b) permits the federal' court to certify one ad­
judicated claim or the adjudicated rights of one party as a final deci­
sion even if the adjudication of the rest of the merits of the case is 
ongoing.117 Rule 54(b) enables a judge to enter a final judgment 
for individual claims in cases with multiple claims or parties.118 
However, the district court must first determine whether no just 
cause exists to delay the entry of a final judgment, which is done on 
a case-by-case basis.119 The decision to certify is solely within the 
discretion of the district court judge.12° Consequently, Rule 54(b) 
makes it possible for a litigant to appeal immediately if the issues 
concerning him or her are determined early.l2l In doing so, this 
rule gives certainty to the appellant that his or her claim is final and 
may be appealed.122 An order becomes "final" for the purposes of 
116. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). 
117. Rule 54(b) states: 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action ... or when 
multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judg­
ment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an 
express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an ex­
press direction for the entry of the judgment. In the absence of such determi­
nation and direction, any order ... however designated, which adjudicates 
fewer than all the claims ... of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate 
the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order ... is subject to 
revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims 
Id. 
118. See id. Multiple claims exist where each claim is factually independent or 
where each claim could be enforced separately. See Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. 
Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 582-83 (1980); Rieser v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 224 F.2d 
198, 199 (2d Cir. 1955). 
119. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 435 (1956). 
120. See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1,8 (1980) ("Not all 
final judgments on individual claims should be immediately appealable, even if they are 
in some sense separable from the remaining unresolved claims. The function of the 
district court under the Rule is to act as a 'dispatcher."') (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co., 
351 U.S. at 435). 
121. See FDIC v. Tripati, 769 F.2d 507 (8th Cir. 1985). The effect of certification 
is that the statute of limitations regarding appeal on the judgment begins to run. See id. 
at 508. 
122. See Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 512 (1950). In 
Dickinson, the Supreme Court stated that: 
The obvious purpose of [Rule 54(b)] ... is to reduce as far as possible the 
uncertainty and the hazard assumed by a litigant who either does or does not 
appeal from a judgment of the character we have here. It provides an oppor­
tunity for litigants to obtain from the District Court a clear statement of what 
that court is intending with reference to finality, and if such direction is de­
nied, the litigant can at least protect himself accordingly. 
Id. (footnote omitted); see also 10 CHAru.Es ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRAC­
TICE AND PROCEDURE § 2654, at 37 (1998) ("The requirement in Rule 54(b) that the 
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§ 1291 when judgment is entered pursuant to Rule 54(b) and is im­
mediately appealable even though it is not the final judgment re­
garding all of the claims or parties. l23 
Nevertheless, Rule 54(b) certifications are not freely given.124 
As a result, this avenue of review, while appearing promising, is not 
often travelled. Another avenue of review that circumvents the fi­
nality requirement is the collateral order doctrine. 
c. The Collateral Order Doctrine 
The collateral order doctrine, which the United States 
Supreme Court first announced in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial 
Loan Corp.,12s provides for interlocutory appeals of collateral or­
ders.126 In Cohen, the United States Supreme Court held that 
where the order is within the "small class [of decisions] which fi­
nally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, 
rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and 
too independent of the cause [of action] itself to require that appel­
court make an express determination that there is no just reason for delaying the review 
of a judgment on fewer than all of the claims or involving fewer than all of the parties in 
an action eliminated any doubt whether an immediate appeal may be sought."). 
123. See FED. R. CIv. P. 54(b). 
124. See Spiegel v. Trustees of Tufts College, 843 F.2d 38, 42 (1st Cir. 1988) ("Yet 
Rule 54(b) notwithstanding, there is a long-settled and prudential policy against the 
scattershot disposition of litigation."); Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Archer, 655 F.2d 962, 
965 (9th Cir. 1981) ("Judgments under Rule 54(b) must be reserved for the unusual case 
in which the costs and risks of multiplying the number of proceedings and of over­
crowding the appellate docket are outbalanced by pressing needs of the litigants for an 
early and separate judgment as to some claims or parties."). 
125. 337 U.S. 541 (1949). In Cohen, the Supreme Court permitted the appeal of 
an order requiring the plaintiff in a stockholder's derivative suit to post security for the 
reasonable expenses of the defendant if the plaintiff was unsuccessful in the suit. See id. 
at 546-47. 
126. See id. at 546. While there is some debate over whether the collateral order 
doctrine is an exception to § 1291 or merely an interpretation of § 1291, most courts, 
including the United States Supreme Court, believe that the collateral order doctrine is 
an exception. See id. at 545-46; see also Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 
424, 430 (1985) (stating that the collateral order doctrine is a "narrow exception"); 
Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 11 (1983) (charac­
terizing the collateral order doctrine as an exception). But see Iuteri v. Nardoza, 662 
F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 1981) (characterizing an order as final because it gave relief which 
was collateral to the merits and was not subject to review after trial); United States v. 
Lansdown, 460 F.2d 164, 170 (4th Cir. 1972) (classifying the collateral order doctrine as 
an exception, but also stating that the Supreme Court, in Cohen, was merely interpret­
ing the meaning of final judgment). See generally Redish, supra note 76, at 111 n.120 
(acknowledging that the collateral order doctrine has been described as both an inter­
pretation and an exception to § 1291 and finding that the better view is to regard it as 
an exception since its purpose is to permit review of interlocutory orders which are not 
final). 
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late consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated," 
an interlocutory appeal may be had.127 After the ruling in Cohen, 
courts and litigants frequently used the collateral order doctrine to 
avoid the final judgment rule.128 
Responding to the overuse of the collateral order doctrine, the 
Supreme Court, in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,129 restated the 
test. Under the new test, in order to be reviewed under the collat­
eral order doctrine "an order must [1] conclusively determine the 
disputed question, [2] resolve an important issue completely sepa­
rate from the merits of the action, and [3] be effectively unreview­
able on appeal from a final judgment."130 The Supreme Court 
qualified the collateral order doctrine a second time when it stated 
that only when "rights ... will be irretrievably lost in the absence of 
an immediate appeal" will an order qualify for immediate review 
under the collateral order doctrine.131 The reformulation effected 
in Coopers & Lybrand narrowed the scope of the collateral order 
doctrine.132 As a result, the federal courts have not allowed imme­
diate appeals under the collateral order doctrine from pretrial deni­
127. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546. 
128. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156,169-72 (1974); see also Marti­
neau, supra note 54, at 740 (stating that "[t]here were few orders that a determined 
court of appeals could not qualify under the Cohen opinion"); Theodore D. Frank, 
Requiem for the Final Judgment Rule, 45 TEX. L. REv. 292 (1966) (discussing the wide­
spread use of the collateral order rule to avoid final judgment requirements). 
129. 437 U.S. 463 (1978). In Coopers & Lybrand, the Supreme Court rejected the 
Second Circuit's determination that a denial of a motion to certify a class was review­
able as a collateral order. See id. at 465. 
130. Id. at 468. 
131. See Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1985); see also 
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526-27 (1985) (holding that an order involving quali­
fied immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine); Nixon v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 742 (1982) (holding that an order involving absolute immunity 
is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine); Devine v. Indian River 
County Sch. Bd., 121 F.3d 576, 579 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that the court of appeals 
has jurisdiction over an order denying pro se status under the collateral order doctrine); 
O'Reilly v. New York Tl1Iles, Co., 692 F.2d 863, 866 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that an 
order denying a motion to proceed pro se was appealable). 
132. In each of the following cases, the order was held unreviewable under the 
collateral order doctrine. These cases evidence the narrow scope of the collateral order 
doctrine. See, e.g., Lauro Lines v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495 (1989) (denying motion to 
dismiss because of a forum selection clause); Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 
489 U.S. 794, 799-800 (1989) (alleging violation of FED. R. <:RIM. P. 6(e»; Gulfstream 
Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271 (1988) (denying motion to stay or 
dismiss because of a similar matter pending in state court); Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 
486 U.S. 517 (1988) (denying motion to dismiss on the ground that a defendant is im­
mune from civil process, and because of forum non conveniens); Richardson-Merrell 
Inc., 472 U.S. at 424 (disqualifying counsel in civil case); Hanagan v. United States, 465 
U.S. 259 (1984) (disqualifying or refusing to disqualify counsel in a criminal case). 
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als of motions alleging speedy trial violations,133 prosecutorial 
vindictiveness,134 or motions to suppress evidence.135 
Nonetheless, the collateral order doctrine permits interlocu­
tory review of orders that do not necessarily end the litigation on 
the merits. For example, the Supreme Court has held that denials 
of motions to dismiss an indictment based on the Double Jeopardy 
Clause, as well as denials of pretrial motions to dismiss based on the 
Speech and Debate Clause, are immediately appealable collateral 
orders.136 In addition, the Supreme Court has held that rulings on 
133. See United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 858-61 (1978) (denying im­
mediate appellate review of a denial of a motion to dismiss based on an alleged viola­
tion of a constitutional right to a speedy trial because the issue was not collateral, the 
determination was not final, and the right to appeal was not forever lost if review was 
delayed); United States v. Jackson, 30 F.3d 572, 574 (5th Cir. 1994) (denying immediate 
appellate review of an alleged violation of the Speedy Trial Act because the order was 
reviewable at a later time); United States v. Tsosie, 966 F.2d 1357, 1359-62 (10th Cir. 
1992) (same); United States v. Buchanan, 946 F.2d 325, 327 (4th Cir. 1991) (same); 
United States v. Holub, 944 F.2d 441, 442 (8th Cir. 1991) (same); ct. United States v. 
Ford, 961 F.2d 150, 151 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (holding that the district court 
dismissal of an indictment without prejudice for violation of the speedy trial provision 
of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act was not immediately appealable because 
the order was reviewable at a later date). But cf. United States v. Gates, 935 F.2d 187, 
188 (11th Cir. 1991) (allowing an immediate appeal from a denial of a motion for re­
lease from pretrial detention pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act). 
134. See United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263, 270 (1982) 
(per curiam) (denying the immediate appeal of a claim of prosecutorial vindictiveness 
because the issue was reviewable after judgment); United States v. McKinley, 38 F.3d 
428, 431 (9th Cir. 1994) (refusing to consider issue of prosecutorial vindictiveness on 
interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction). But cf. United States v. P.H.E., Inc., 965 
F.2d 848, 853-56 (10th Cir. 1992) (allowing the immediate appeal of a denial of a claim 
of bad-faith prosecution because the right not to be tried is lost once tried). 
135. See DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121,131 (1962) (denying the immedi­
ate review of orders granting or denying the suppression of evidence which was alleg­
edly procured through an unlawful search and seizure); Carroll v. United States, 354 
U.S. 394, 404-05 (1957) (holding that an order granting a motion to suppress was not 
immediately appealable even if the result would be forced dismissal of the indictment 
for lack of evidence); United States v. Carney, 665 F.2d 1064, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per 
curiam) (holding that a denial of a motion to suppress evidence that was purportedly 
covered by the Speech and Debate Clause was not immediately appealable because the 
decision was not final); cf. United States v. Miller, 14 F.3d 761, 765 (2d Cir. 1994) (deny­
ing the immediate appeal of an order, which denied a temporary restraining order that 
would have prohibited the release of intercepted conversations, because order was re­
viewable on final judgment and was adjudicated in appellant's own trials). But see In re 
Search Warrant (sealed), 810 F.2d 67, 70 (3d Cir. 1987) (allowing an immediate appeal 
of an order denying a motion to suppress medical records because the privacy rights of 
the patients were sufficiently independent from the criminal proceeding against the 
physician). 
136. See Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 397 (1995) (allowing the immediate 
appeal of a denial of a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds even where the 
accused had not yet been convicted a second time); Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 
591 1999] INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION GRANTS OF BAIL 
motions to reduce excessive bail are also immediately appealable 
collateral orders.137 
d. The All Writs Act138 
Writs of mandamus139 also operate to provide review of non­
final decisions despite the final judgment rule. The statutory basis 
for writs of mandamus is the All Writs Act, which provides that 
"[t]he Supreme Court and all courts established by [an] Act of Con­
gress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their 
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles 
of the law."140 
Higher courts use writs of mandamus to review cases of clear 
abuse of discretion by lower courts,141 and to review cases where a 
judge has attempted to exercise a power he or she does not pos­
508 (1979) (stating that Speech and Debate Clause protects members of Congress from 
standing trial, which would be lost if immediate review was unavailable); Abney v. 
United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659-63 (1977) (alIowing an immediate appeal of a denial of 
a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds because the right to not be tried twice 
is forever lost if tried). 
137. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6 (1951) (allowing immediate appeal of a 
denial of a motion to reduce bail because relief must be speedy to be effective); United 
States v. Gigante, 85 F.3d 83, 85 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (alIowing immediate appeal 
of an order imposing a bail condition requiring the forfeiture of a $1 million bail bond if 
the defendant committed a crime while on release, because the order was colIateral to 
the issue of guilt in the instant case and involved a risk of unreviewable damage to a 
constitutional right); United States v. Loya, 23 F.3d 1529, 1530 (9th Cir. 1994) (alIowing 
immediate appeal of an order denying bail pending a hearing on revocation of super­
vised release); United States v. Smith, 835 F.2d 1048, 1049-50 (3d Cir. 1987) (alIowing 
immediate appeal of an order denying bail pending disposition of a habeas corpus peti­
tion because the order was separate from the merits, conclusively determined the ques­
tion, and was effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment); United States v. 
Spilotro, 786 F.2d 808, 812-13 (8th Cir. 1986) (alIowing immediate appeal of an order 
denying a motion to reduce bail after pretrial release because the order was final, colIat­
eral to the issue of guilt, and involved risk of irreparable damage to a constitutional 
right); cf. United States v. Gundersen, 978 F.2d 580, 582-83 (10th Cir. 1992) (allowing 
immediate appeal). 
138. 28 U.S.c. § 1651 (1994). 
139. Mandamus is a Latin word meaning "[w]e command." BLACK'S LAW DIC­
TIONARY 961 (6th ed. 1990). The writ of mandamus originated in English common law 
where it was generalIy used by the King to require an inferior court to do a particular 
thing. See Crick, supra note 55, at 544-55. 
140. 28 U.S.c. § 1651 (1994). 
141. See Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 109-10 (1964) (observing that a 
writ of mandamus may be issued appropriately to review an expropriation of judicial 
power or an abuse of discretion); Rapp v. Van Dusen, 350 F.2d 806, 812 (3d Cir. 1965) 
(stating that "modem use [of writ of mandamus] has been extended to include cases of 
clear abuse of discretion"); In re Watkins, 271 F.2d 771, 772 (5th Cir. 1959) (explaining 
that writs of mandamus should only be used in extreme cases where there is clear abuse 
of discretion or expropriation of judicial power). 
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sess.142 For example, the courts of appeals use the writ of manda­
mus as a method of supervising the district courts.143 Many cases 
have held that the writ of mandamus should only be used "to con­
fine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdic­
tion or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do 
SO."144 
Although the writ of mandamus can operate as an exception to 
the finality requirement of § 1291, the scope of its use is very nar­
row. In fact, writs of mandamus are to be used only in extraordi­
nary circumstances, such as when there is an obvious error or a 
novel issue of law.145 Despite the limited scope of its use, the writ 
142. See Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Krentzman, 397 F.2d 55, 59 (5th Cir. 
1968). 
143. See La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957) (affirming Seventh 
Circuit's decision to grant a writ of mandamus where the case had been referred to a 
master despite the objections of every party). The Court stated, "[w]e believe that su­
pervisory control of the District Courts by the Courts of Appeals is necessary to proper 
judicial administration in the federal system. The All Writs Act confers on the Courts 
of Appeals the discretionary power to issue writs of mandamus in the exceptional cir­
cumstances existing here." Id. at 259-60. 
144. Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943); see also Allied 
Chem. Corp. v. Daifion, Inc. 449 U.S. 33, 35 (1980) (quoting Roche, 319 U.S. at 26); Will 
v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 661 (1978) (same); Kerr v. United States Dist. 
Court, 426 U.S. 394,402 (1976) (same); Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967) 
(same); Platt v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 376 U.S. 240, 245 (1964) (same); Bank­
ers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 382 (1953) (same); United States Alkali 
Export Ass'n v. United States, 325 U.S. 196,202 (1945) (same); Ex parte Republic of 
Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 583 (1943) ("The writs thus afford an expeditious and effective 
means of confining the inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction, 
or of compelling it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so."). 
145. See Will, 389 U.S. at 95 ("[O]nly exceptional circumstances ... will justify the 
invocation of this extraordinary remedy."); Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at 110 (stating that 
the "writ is appropriately issued ... when there is a 'usurpation of judicial power' or a 
clear abuse of discretion") (quoting Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 346 U.S. at 383); Ex parte 
Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 260 (1947) (stating that extraordinary writs are "reserved for really 
extraordinary causes"); In re Attorney Gen. of United States, 596 F.2d 58, 63 (2d Cir. 
1979) (stating that only exceptional cases warrant the exercise of supervisory control 
through the use of a writ of mandamus); National Farmers' Org., Inc. v. Oliver, 530 F.2d 
815, 816 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that the power of courts of appeals to issue writs of 
mandamus should only be used in exceptional or extraordinary circumstances); Dow 
Chem. Co. v. Taylor, 519 F.2d 352, 355 (6th Cir. 1975) (same); General Motors Corp. v. 
Lord, 488 F.2d 1096, 1099 (8th Cir. 1973) (explaining that the use of a writ of mandamus 
is only appropriate in extraordinary circumstances, which may be present when a dis­
trict court's order is made without jurisdiction, or where the order under attack is char­
acteristic of an erroneous practice which is likely to recur, or where an order under 
attack exemplifies a novel and important question in need of guidelines that will aid the 
future resolution of similar cases); cf. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp. v. Civic Ctr. Thea­
tre, Inc., 333 F.2d 358, 360 (10th Cir. 1964) (stating that exercise of the power granted in 
28 U.S.c. § 1651 is discretionary). 
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of mandamus nevertheless provides review of orders that could not 
be reviewed within the ambit of the finality requirement of § 1291. 
Having traversed a great deal of background material, this 
Note will now tum its attention to the case that brought the issue 
discussed herein to light. 
II. UNITED STATES V. K IRByl46 
A. Factual Setting 
In 1983, after escaping from the Maze Prison in Belfast, North­
ern Ireland, Terence Kirby,147 Pol Brennan,148 and Kevin Artt149 
arrived in the United States.150 After extradition was requested by 
the United Kingdom, United States' authorities arrested the poten­
tial extraditees and held them in custody to await an extradition 
hearing.151 The potential extraditees moved for bail, and the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of California 
set bail for each.152 All three were released, and the United States, 
on behalf of the United Kingdom, appealed to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit seeking review of the district 
court's grant of bail.153 Before reviewing the grant of bail, the 
Ninth Circuit specifically addressed whether it had jurisdiction to 
review a bail decision by a district court judge in an extradition 
matter.154 
146. 106 F.3d 855 (9th Cir. 1997). 
147. Terence Kirby was convicted of various violent offenses in Northern Ireland 
including felony murder, use of explosives, and possession of a firearm and explosives 
with intent to cause injury. See In re Requested Extradition of Artt, 972 F. Supp. 1253, 
1263 (N.D. Cal. 1997). 
148. Pol Brennan was convicted in Northern Ireland of possession or control of a 
bomb with the intent to endanger life or cause serious injury to property. See id. at 
1261. 
149. Kevin Artt was convicted of murder in Northern Ireland. See id. at 1265. 
150. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 857. 
151. See id. 
152. See id. at 858. On January 3, 1996, Pol Brennan was released and committed 
to the custody of his wife and employer on $500,000 bond, secured by $500,000 in prop­
erty pledged by sureties. See id. Terence Kirby was released on the same date and 
committed to the custody of three people, other than his wife with whom he resided, on 
$1,000,000 bond secured by $500,000 in property and the signatures of five sureties. See 
id. On January 10, 1996, Kevin Artt was released and committed to the custody of his 
housemate and his employer on $500,000 bond secured by $100,000 in cash or property 
and the signatures of five sureties. See id. 
153. See id. at 857-58. 
154. See id. at 858. 
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B. The Majority Opinion 
1. Preliminary Discussion of Jurisdictional Issue 
Judge Sneed, writing for the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit, began the majority's analysis by quoting 
. § 1291 which grants courts of appeals "jurisdiction of appeals from 
all final decisions of the district courtS."155 Immediately thereafter 
and without further explanation, the majority disagreed with the 
extraditees's proposition that the court did not have jurisdiction to 
hear this appeal because, according to the extraditees, bail rulings 
in extradition matters were neither "final decisions" nor "decisions 
of district courtS."156 Next, the majority explained that granting 
bail in extradition matters is not favored and, in fact, bail is only 
granted if "special circumstances" exist.157 The majority noted that 
the disapproval of bail in extradition cases unless "special circum­
stances" are present is in direct opposition to the presumption that 
bail will be granted in domestic cases without any required showing 
of special circumstances.158 The majority then explained that, un­
like habeas corpus cases where the government's right to appeal is 
set forth by statute,159 there is no authority that explicitly grants 
jurisdiction to hear this appeal, and there is no Supreme Court rul­
ing that speaks to this factual setting.160 
Before defining the bail decision in this case as a "final deci­
sion of the district court," the majority set forth several reasons why 
the argument made by the extraditees, that bail decisions in extradi­
tion cases are not reviewable, could not properly stand.161 First, the 
majority found that denying the government the right to appeal in 
this instance would result in asymmetry between the potential ex­
traditee and the government because the potential extraditee could 
always appeal through the use of habeas corpus while the govern­
ment would have no further avenue to pursue.162 Second, the ma­
155. Id.; see also 28 U.S.c. § 1291 (1994). See supra Part 1.C.2 for a discussion of 
the history of § 1291. 
156. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 858. 
157. See id. (citing Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 63 (1903». 
158. See id. (citing Beaulieu v. Hartigan, 554 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1977». 
159. See id. Section 2255 of the Federal Courts Improvement Act provides the 
right to appeal habeas corpus decisions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). 
The statute states, "[a]n appeal may be taken to the court of appeals from the order 
entered on the motion as from the final judgment on application for a writ of habeas 
corpus." Id. 
160. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 858. 
161. See id. at 858-59. 
162. See id. at 858. 
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jority expressed concern that since the only time bail-can be granted 
in extradition cases is when "special circumstances" are present, de­
nying review of these determinations would "inadequately secure 
the 'special circumstances' requirement."163 Third, the majority 
found that if the "special circumstances" requirement was allowed 
to be weakened through the denial of judicial review, then the abil­
ity of the United States to comply with its treaties would be viewed 
by other nations as compromised.l64 
The majority asserted that the ability of the Unites States to 
comply with its treaties was especially important in light of the fer­
vent attention being paid to the unrest in Northern Ireland,165 such 
that the courts must act "sensitively and scrupulously" in the role 
appointed to them by the Supplementary Treaty.166 Nevertheless, 
the majority recognized that the treaty did not guarantee jurisdic­
tion to the court of appeals to review the grant of bail given by the 
district court in this case.167 Rather, the majority found that § 1291 
provided the basis for the court's jurisdiction over this matter.168 
2. Appellate Jurisdiction Under Section 1291 
a. Grants of bail are decisions of the district court 
The majority began by defining bail decisions as decisions of 
the district court and rejected the extraditees' argument and the dis­
sent's argument that the district court granted bail using authority 
given by § 3184 of the Bail Reform Act of 1984.169 The majority 
reasoned that since § 3184 merely pertains to apprehending and 
certifying the potential extraditee for extradition, and makes no 
mention of granting bail, the district court could not possibly have 
been using the power granted in § 3184 when it granted bail.170 
163. Id. at 859. The majority did not elaborate; however, when a standard is not 
reviewable it can be whittled away, because there is no means to ensure it remains 
stringent. 
164. See id. 
165. See id. See generally James T. Kelly, Article, The Empire Strikes Back: The 
Taking ofJoe Doherty, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 317, 318-29 (1992) (discussing thoroughly 
the problems occurring in Northern Ireland). 
166. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 859. 
167. See id; see also Extradition Treaty, supra note 10. 
168. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 859-61; see also 28 U.S.c. § 1291 (1994). 
169. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 859; see also Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.c. § 3184 (1994 
& Supp. II 1996). See infra note 170 for the relevant language of § 3184. 
170. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 859; see also 18 U.S.c. § 3184 (1994 & Supp. 111996) 
which states: 
Whenever there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the 
United States and any foreign government . . . any justice or judge of the 
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According to the majority, the authority of the district court to 
set bail was established in Wright v. Henkel,171 where the United 
States Supreme Court gave courts the power to grant bail.172 The 
Kirby majority reasoned that a judge's bail decision is a decision "of 
the district court" because the power was given to "courts" as op­
posed to judges or magistrates.173 Thus, the majority concluded 
that the bail decision made in this case was a decision made by the 
district court as required by § 1291.174 
b. 	 Bail rulings in extradition cases are final decisions under 
section 1291 
In determining that bail decisions in extradition cases are final 
decisions, the majority reviewed § 3145 of the Bail Reform Act of 
1984175 which states, in relevant part, that appeals in criminal cases 
are "governed by the provisions of § 1291 of title 28 and § 3731 of 
[title 18]."176 The majority then, without mention of § 3731p7 ana­
lyzed § 1291 which covers "final decisions" and § 1292 which, con-
United States, or any magistrate ... may, upon complaint made under oath, 
charging any person found within his jurisdiction, with having committed 
within the jurisdiction of any such foreign government any of the crimes pro­
vided for by such treaty or convention ... issue his warrant for the apprehen­
sion of the person so charged, that he may be brought before such justice, 
judge, or magistrate, to the end that the evidence of criminality may be heard 
and considered . 
. . . If, on such hearing, he deems the evidence sufficient to sustain the 
charge under the provisions of the proper treaty or convention, he shall certify 
the same, together with a copy of all the testimony taken before him, to the 
Secretary of State, that a warrant may issue upon the requisition of the proper 
authorities of such foreign government, for the surrender of such person, ac­
cording to the stipulations of the treaty or convention; and he shall issue his 
warrant for the commitment of the person so charged to the proper jail, there 
to remain until such surrender shall be made. 
Id. 
171. 190 U.S. 40 (1903). 
172. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 859 (citing Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 63 (1903». 
173. See id. 
174. See id. 
175. 18 U.S.C. § 3145 (1994). 
176. Id.; see also Kirby, 106 F.3d at 859. 
177. Although it was not explicitly addressed in the opinion, § 3731 of the Omni­
bus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act governs when appeals may be taken by the 
United States in criminal cases. The dissent used the existence of § 3731 to argue that 
bail decisions in extradition cases are different than in criminal cases because, unlike 
extradition cases, there are explicit statutory provisions granting the right of appeal to 
the United States in criminal cases. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 867; see also Bail Reform 
Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3145, 3731 (1994). 
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versely, covers "interlocutory decisions."178 The majority deduced 
that bail decisions are not merely interlocutory because if they 
were, § 1292, which governs interlocutory decisions, would have 
been specified as governing domestic bail appeals in § 3145. In­
stead, the majority found that § 1291, which controls final decisions, 
was specified.179 The majority then concluded that bail decisions in 
general are final decisions.18o 
Next, the majority reasoned that the bail decision serves the 
same purpose in either a domestic criminal case or an extradition 
case.181 The majority pointed out that in both cases bail decisions 
determine whether a person will be held in custody or released 
pending further proceedings in his case.182 Due to this similarity, 
the majority found that bail decisions in extradition cases are final 
decisions just like bail decisions in criminal cases.183 
Further, the majority addressed the dissent's argument that the 
absence of a statutory provision allowing direct appeals in extradi­
tion cases distinguishes extradition cases from criminal cases pre­
cisely because there is such a statute concerning appeals in criminal 
cases.l84 The majority responded by noting that explicit statutory 
grants of authority are not always necessary before a court may 
act,185 The majority found the dissent's argument to be inconsistent 
with the dissent's own reasoning in the case.186 The majority 
pointed out that the dissent contradicted itself when it first agreed 
178. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 860. 
179. See id.; see also 18 U.S.c. § 3731 (1994); 28 U.S.c. §§ 1291-92 (1994). 
180. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 860. 
181. See id. 
182. See id. 
183. See id. After reaching this conclusion, the majority, in a footnote, countered 
the dissent's argument that extradition cases differ from criminal cases because the gov­
ernment can always begin new extradition proceedings and, in effect, appeal an adverse 
bail ruling. See id. at 860 n.5. The majority found the dissent's reasoning unsatisfac­
tory, stating that if the government was required to initiate new proceedings instead of 
being allowed to directly appeal, then efficiency in the judicial process, which is of ut­
most concern, would be lost. See id. 
184. See id. at 860. 
185. See id. The majority explained in a footnote that previously, when no ex­
plicit statutory provision existed to provide for government appeals of bail rulings in 
criminal cases, some courts found jurisdiction. See id. at 860 n.6. (citing Iuteri v. 
Nardoza, 662 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 1981». The majority further explained that Con­
gress later passed the Bail Reform Act of 1984 to provide jurisdiction for government 
appeals of bail rulings in criminal cases explicitly where Congress said it may have been 
implicit in earlier statutes. See id. The majority appeared to suggest that jurisdiction 
for this appeal is also implicit in earlier statutes, i.e. § 1291, even though it has not yet 
been explicitly granted. See id. at 860. 
186. See id. 
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that district court judges could grant bail in extradition cases de­
spite no explicit authority to do so, and then argued that there 
could be no right to review the bail decision without explicit statu­
tory authority.187 The majority conceded that some basis must be 
found to provide jurisdiction before it could hear the case.188 How­
ever, the majority also asserted that courts would be severely lim­
ited if explicit statutes were required in every instance.189 
After the preceding discussion, the majority reaffirmed its de­
termination that, just as a decision to grant bail in a criminal case is 
final under § 1291, a decision to grant bail in an extradition case is 
also final.190 Next, the majority turned to other case law for sup­
port of its holding. 
c. Other case law supports the finding of jurisdiction 
The majority supported its holding by citing other cases in 
which courts had reviewed bail decisions in extradition matters.191 
The majority cited these cases because in each case the appellate 
court reviewed the district court's grant of bail, without ever ad­
dressing whether they had jurisdiction to do SO.I92 Next, the major­
ity distinguished cases where courts had ruled that they did not 
have jurisdiction to review bail decisions in extradition cases.193 
The majority distinguished these cases by pointing out that in each 
187. See id. In making this point, the majority stated, "Judge Noonan cannot 
have it both ways." Id. The majority further reasoned that either the district court 
judge had no authority to grant bail in the first place, or if he did have that power, then 
it follows that an explicit grant of authority is not always necessary before a judge may 
act. See id. 
188. The majority found that § 1291 provided the basis for jurisdiction of this 
appeal. See id. 
189. See id. at 860-61. The majority explained that courts do not need statutes 
telling them when to apply other statutes because courts have habitually applied stat­
utes to specific situations without needing explicit authority to do so. See id. at 861. 
The majority found "statutory interpretation would be impossible if judges were pre­
cluded from applying statutes in this manner." Id. 
190. See id. 
191. See id. at 861-62; see also United States v. Kin-Hong, 83 F.3d 523 (1st Cir. 
1996) (reversing district court's grant of bail); In re Extradition of Smyth, 976 F.2d 1535 
(9th Cir. 1992) (same); Hu Yau-Leung v. Soscia, 649 F.2d 914, 920 (2d Cir. 1981) (af­
firming grant of bail by district court in habeas case following magistrate's issuance of 
certificate of extraditability); United States v. Williams, 611 F.2d 914 (1st Cir. 1979) 
(reversing district court's grant of bail). 
192. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 861. 
193. See id. at 861-62; see also In re Extradition of Ghandtchi, 697 F.2d 1037 (11th 
Cir. 1983) (holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to review bail decision in 
extradition case); In re Extradition of Krickemeyer, 518 F. Supp. 388 (S.D. Fla. 1981) 
(same). 
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case the court had held that a district court may not review a magis­
trate's bail decision in an extradition case and did not rule on 
whether a district court's bail decision could be reviewed by the 
court of appeals.l94 Furthermore, the majority discounted these 
cases because they were not controlling authority over the Ninth 
Circuit and because they arose under a different treaty than the one 
at issue in Kirby.195 
d. Judicial responsibility under the treaty favors appellate review 
As a final factor in its decision concerning the jurisdictional 
issue, the majority stressed that judicial responsibility for enforcing 
the treaties made by the United States was placed on the district 
courts and courts of appeals by Article 3(b) of the Supplementary 
Treaty because Article 3(b) explicitly named both sets of courtS.196 
Considering that Article 3(b) provides for an "immediately avail­
able" appeal after a determination concerning the "political of­
fense" defense,197 the majority reasoned that the extraditees would 
most likely come before the court of appeals at a later date.198 
194. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 861. 
195. See id. The treaty involved in In re Extradition of Ghandtchi, 697 F.2d 1037 
(11th Cir. 1983) and In re Extradition ofKrickemeyer, 518 F. Supp. 388 (S.D. Fla. 1981), 
was the extradition treaty between the United States and the Federal Republic of Ger­
many, Extradition Treaty, June 20, 1978, U.S.-F.R.G., 32 U.S.T. 1485. 
196. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 862. Article 3(b) of the Supplementary Treaty states: 
In the United States, the competent judicial authority shall only consider the 
defense to extradition set forth in paragraph (a) for offenses listed in Article I 
of this Supplementary Treaty. A finding under paragraph (a) shall be immedi­
ately appealable by either party to the United States district coun, or coun of 
appeals, as appropriate. The appeal shall receive expedited consideration at 
every stage. The time for filing a notice of appeal shall be 30 days from the 
date of the filing of the decision. In all other respects, the applicable provi­
sions of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure or Civil Procedure, as ap­
propriate, shall govern the appeals process. 
Extradition Treaty, supra note 10 (emphasis added). 
197. The "political offense" defense is embodied in Article 3(a) of the Supple­
mentary Treaty which states: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Supplementary Treaty, extradition 
shall not occur if the person sought establishes to the satisfaction of the com­
petent judicial authority by a preponderance of the evidence that the request 
for extradition has in fact been made with a view to try or punish him on 
account of his race, religion, nationality or political opinions, or that he would, 
if surrendered, be prejudiced at his trial or punished, detained, or restricted in 
his personal liberty by reason of his race, religion, nationality or political 
opinions. 
Extradition Treaty, supra note 10. See supra note 34 for further discussion of the 
"political offense" defense to extradition. 
198. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 862. 
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While stressing the role of the United States' courts in protecting 
the interests and rights of all of the parties involved, the majority 
concluded that these rights and interests would be best preserved 
by review of both the grant of bail and its sufficiency immediately 
after the bail decision was made, as opposed to after the completion 
of the extradition hearing.199 Based on the reasoning set forth 
above, the majority found that it was the court's duty to review the 
grants of bail and their sufficiency.2oo The majority then reviewed 
the grants of bail and found that the grants of bail, as well as the 
terms of each extraditee's bail release, were both proper and 
sufficient.201 
C. The Dissenting Opinion 
Judge Noonan began the dissent by noting that federal courts 
are courts of limited jurisdiction, and as such, they must find their 
199. See id. at 862-63. 
200. See id. at 863. 
201. See id. at 863-65. The majority considered four factors when reviewing the 
grant of bail. The factors considered were the factors relied on by the district court to 
show that special circumstances existed when granting bail. See id. at 863-64. The ma­
jority found that the first factor, delay, was recognized by this and other circuits, and 
because the appellees themselves were not responsible for the delay, it could not find 
that the district court erred in relying on delay as a special circumstance. See id. at 863 
(citing United States v. Kin-Hong, 83 F.3d 523, 524 (1st Cir. 1996); Salerno v. United 
States, 878 F.2d 317 (9th Cir. 1989». 
Next, the majority looked at the "parity with Smyth" factor. See id. at 863. Smyth, 
a potential extraditee whose extremely similar case was determined before this case, 
had been out on bail for over one year by the time the appellees' bail hearings were 
held. See id. The district court, in releasing the appellees, stressed that they should be 
treated consistent with Smyth. See id. Conversely, the United States, focusing on the 
ultimate revocation of Smyth's bail upon review, argued on appeal that the appellees 
should be kept in custody. See id. The majority found that while both arguments had 
merit, the district court's reliance on "parity with Smyth" as a special circumstance was 
understandable. See id. 
Next, the court rejected the district court's third special circumstance, that the ap­
pellees would not receive credit for time spent in custody in the United States upon 
returning to the United Kingdom, because it is common in extradition cases for persons 
extradited to not receive credit for time spent in custody in the United States upon 
return to the requesting nation. See id. 
Reviewing the fourth factor, the majority stated that the district court could not be 
faulted for finding that the "cloud" cast on extradition proceedings by the Lobue case 
was a special circumstance. See id. at 864. In Lobue v. Christopher, 893 F. Supp. 65 
(D.D.C. 1995), vacated, 82 F.3d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1996), the court held that 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3184 (1994 & Supp. II 1996) violated the separation of powers requirement because it 
empowered an Executive Branch official, the Secretary of State, to review an Article III 
judicial officer. See Lobue, 893 F. Supp. at 78. Hence, at the time the district court 
judge in Kirby heard the bail hearings, there was a "cloud" cast over all extradition 
proceedings by the Lobue decision. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 864. 
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authority to review a case in either a statute or the Constitution.202 
The dissent next stressed that the jurisdiction of the courts of ap­
peals is determined by statute,203 and that courts may not expand 
their given jurisdiction by judicial decision.204 The dissent noted 
that the United States had not cited any statute that would confer 
jurisdiction on the United States Courts of Appeals to review bail 
decisions in extradition matters.205 
Even though the dissent found that the absence of any explicit 
statutory authority should be the end of the court's discussion, the 
dissent continued to address arguments raised by the United States 
and by the majority.206 In response to the majority's citation of case 
law in which courts reviewed bail decisions, the dissent highlighted 
the absence of any discussion within these decisions concerning ju­
risdiction to review grants of bail in extradition cases.207 The dis­
sent found this to be critical because when a court does not discuss 
an issue, the case has no precedential value on that issue.208 The 
dissent questioned the majority's· reliance on such 
"nonprecedents."209 
Next, the dissent addressed the argument made by the United 
States that since the district court had no authority to grant bail in 
this case, the district court must have been granting a writ of habeas 
cOrpUS.210 Stating that habeas corpus and bail are two entirely dif­
ferent things, the dissent rejected this argument.211 The dissent 
202. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 865 (Noonan, J., dissenting) (citing Kokkonen v. 
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994». For a discussion of the juris­
dictional requirement in general, see supra Part I.C.1. 
203. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 865 (Noonan, J., dissenting) (citing In re Vylene 
Enter., Inc., 968 F.2d 887, 889 (9th Cir. 1992». Section 1291 determines the jurisdiction 
of the courts of appeals. See Act of June 25, 1948, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994). 
204. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 865 (Noonan, J., dissenting) (citing Kokkonen, 511 
U.S. at 377). 
205. See ill. (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
206. See id. at 865-67 (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
207. See ill. at 865 (Noonan, J., dissenting) (citing In re Extradition of Smyth, 976 
F.2d 1535 (9th Cir. 1992». 
208. See ill. at 865-66 (Noonan, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Vroman, 
975 F.2d 669, 672 (9th Cir. 1992». 
209. See ill. at 866 (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
210. See id. (Noonan, J., dissenting). If this argument had been accepted, the 
government would have been entitled to an appeal pursuant to § 2255 of the Federal 
Courts Improvement Act. See 28 U.S.c. § 2255 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). Section 2255 
states, in relevant part, "An appeal may be taken to the court of appeals from the order 
entered on the motion as from a final judgment on application for a writ of habeas 
corpus." Id. 
211. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 866 (Noonan, J., dissenting). Emphasizing the differ­
ences between a grant of bail and a grant of a writ of habeas corpus, the dissent noted 
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briefly recognized that a writ of mandamus would not be appropri­
ate.212 The dissent noted that both parties had briefed the issue, 
and the United States had conceded that three of the five factors 
necessary to obtain mandamus were absent.213 
Finally, the dissent turned to the majority's argument that bail 
decisions by district court judges in extradition matters are review­
able because they are in fact "final decisions." First, the dissent 
found that the decision to grant bail was not made by the district 
court.214 The dissent reasoned that an extradition judge does not 
exercise judicial power; rather, he or she is an auxiliary to the exec­
utive branch.2Is According to the dissent, an extradition judge's de­
cision can not be a final decision of the district court because he or 
that bail is normally governed by statute whereas habeas corpus is a constitutional rem­
edy. See id. (Noonan, J., dissenting) (citing Bail Reform Act of 1984,18 U.S.c. §§ 3146, 
3148,3156 (1994». The dissent further reasoned that habeas corpus challenges the le­
gality of the confinement by the state whereas bail does not; instead, when one asks for 
bail, he is merely stating that confinement is not necessary to guarantee his presence at 
further proceedings in his case. See id. (Noonan, J., dissenting) (citing Walters v. 
Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1995». Further, the dissent remarked that in order 
for review on habeas corpus to be granted, all other avenues of review must be ex­
hausted. See id. (Noonan, J., dissenting) (citing Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515-16 
(1982». The dissent pointed out that this is in contrast to an application for bail, which 
can be determined immediately, by petitioning the judge in charge of the prisoner. See 
id. (Noonan, J., dissenting). Lastly, the dissent observed that the standard of review is 
de novo in a habeas case whereas the standard of review is deferential when reviewing a 
bail decision. See id. (Noonan, J., dissenting) (citing Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 
1451 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Townsend, 897 F.2d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 1990». De 
novo review results in "[t]rying the matter anew; the same as if it had not been heard 
before and as if no decision had been previously rendered." BLACK'S LAW DICTION­
ARY 435 (6th ed. 1990). Conversely, deferential review results in the court upholding 
the lower court's decision unless it is obviously in error. In this sense, the appellate 
court "defers" to the judgment of the lower court. Ultimately, the dissent concluded 
that the extraditees applied for and were granted bail; hence, they could not have been 
granted writs of habeas corpus. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 866 (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
212. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 866 (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
213. See id. (Noonan, J., dissenting). The five factors which must be present to 
obtain mandamus, as stated in Bauman v. United States District Court, 557 F.2d 650, 
654-55 (9th Cir. 1977), are: 
(1) The party seeking the writ has no other adequate means, such as a direct 
appeal, to attain the relief he or she desires .... (2) The petitioner will be 
damaged or prejudiced in a way not correctable on appeal (3) The district 
court's order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law (4) The district court's 
order is an oft-repeated error, or manifests a persistent disregard of the fed­
eral rules (5) The district court's order raises new and important problems, or 
issues of law of first impression. 
(citations omitted). 
214. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 866 (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
215. See id. (Noonan, J., dissenting) (citing In re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103, 
119 (1852); In re Extradition of Howard, 996 F.2d 1320, 1325 (1st Cir. 1993». 
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she is acting as an auxiliary, not as the court.216 
Second, the dissent found that the district court's order was not 
final because the government is not barred by res judicata217 in ex­
tradition matters.218 The dissent explained that if the extradition 
decision itself is not final, then the bail decision within it cannot be 
final.219 The dissent noted that releases on bail do not conclusively 
determine a disputed question.220 Accordingly, the dissent asserted 
that noncompliance with a technical rule of procedure was suffi­
cient to deny this court jurisdiction.221 Consequently, the dissent 
disputed the majority's reasoning and found that the decision could 
not be a "final decision" as called for by § 1291.222 
Third, the dissent explained that since the Federal Rules of 
Procedure pertain to either criminal or civil cases, the Federal 
Rules contain no provisions regarding the review of bail decisions 
in extradition matters.223 The dissent stressed that an explicit stat­
ute was necessary to provide appellate review of bail orders beyond 
any alleged jurisdictional power provided for in § 1291.224 Based 
on this observation, the dissent reasoned that the absence of an ex­
plicit statute in this situation highlighted the lack of jurisdiction.225 
The dissent concluded its reasoning by questioning the major­
ity's use of § 1291 as a basis for jurisdiction in this case.226 The 
dissent challenged the majority's reliance on § 1291 because that 
reliance created the impression that § 3731, which was created to 
provide jurisdiction over appeals in domestic criminal bail cases, is 
216. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 866 (Noonan, J., dissenting); see also Act of June 25, 
1948, 28 U.S.c. § 1291 (1994). 
217. Res judicata refers to the "[r]ule that a final judgment rendered by a court of 
competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and 
their privies, and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involv­
ing the same claim, demand, or cause of action." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1305 (6th 
ed.1990). 
218. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 866 (Noonan, J., dissenting) (citing Hooker v. Klein, 
573 F.2d 1360, 1368 (9th Cir. 1978». 
219. See id. (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
220. See id. at 866-67 (Noonan, J., dissenting) (citing Confederated Salish v. 
Simonich, 29 F.3d 1398, 1402 (9th Cir. 1994». 
221. See id. at 867 (Noonan, J., dissenting) (citing Lopez v. City of Needles, 95 
F.3d 20 (9th Cir. 1996); Proud v. United States, 704 F.2d 1099, 1100 (9th Cir. 1983». 
222. See id. at 866-67 (Noonan, J., dissenting); see also 28 U.S.c. § 1291 (1994). 
223. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 867 (Noonan, J., dissenting) (citing Merino v. United 
States Marshall, 326 F.2d 5, 12-13 (9th Cir. 1963». 
224. See id. (Noonan, J., dissenting) (citing 18 U.S.c. §§ 3145, 3731 (1994». 
225. See id. (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
226. See id. (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
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redundant.227 The dissent suggested that if bail decisions fit as 
neatly within § 1291 as the majority found, then the enactment of 
§ 3731 would have been unnecessary because the right to appeal 
domestic grants of bail would have already been provided for by 
§ 1291.228 The dissent commented that it was a poor choice for the 
majority to interpret an existing statute such that it renders a later 
act of Congress unnecessary. 229 
Lastly, the dissent discussed policy choices that should shape 
the court's actions.23o The dissent recognized that reaching a deci­
sion that would give the court jurisdiction was enticing.231 How­
ever, the dissent emphasized that the court should not act beyond 
that which has been mandated by Congre8s.232 The dissent re­
marked that the court's decision should be enough to alert Con­
gress to the potential void in the statutes that provide jurisdiction to 
the courts of appeals, and that it is Congress's duty, not the courts', 
to fill that void if Congress deems it necessary.233 The dissent as­
serted that judicial activism that goes so far that a judge will create 
jurisdiction where none exists, simply because it is desirable, is in 
direct opposition to our government of laws, which requires that 
-courts only act where a l,aw has given them the authority to do 80.234 
Now that familiarity with the salient information has been 
gained, the next section of this Note analyzes the Ninth Circuit's 
decision in United States v. Kirby. 
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
International extradition entails a process that is controlled by 
treaty and federal statutes.235 These sources of law provide a 
mechanism whereby a country who is a party to the treaty can re­
quest the surrender of a person who is found within the territory of 
the United States. 
During the extradition process, the "extraditee" awaits a hear­
ing that determines whether he or she will be extradited. Some­
227. See id. (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
228. See id. (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
229. See id. (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
230. See id. (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
231. See id. (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
232. See id. (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
233. See id. (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
234. See id. (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
235. See supra Part I.A for a discussion of the extradition process in greater 
depth. 
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times, while awaiting this hearing, the extraditee moves for bail. If 
the presiding judicial body grants bail, the United States can at­
tempt to have the grant of bail revoked, thereby placing the poten­
tial extraditee back in its custody, by reinstituting the extradition 
process with a second judicial body or by obtaining appellate review 
of the bail decision.236 
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Kirby,237 was the first 
court to address the jurisdictional issue of whether the United 
States Courts of Appeals may review a grant of bail by a United 
States Distrtct Court judge in an extradition mater.238 The primary 
disagreement between the majority and dissenting opinions in 
Kirby centered around whether a grant of bail in an international 
extradition matter is a final decision of the district court, which may 
be reviewed by the court of appeals.239 
The Kirby majority found that appellate jurisdiction existed for 
the court of appeals to review the district court's grant of bail be­
cause 28 U.S.c. § 1291 provides that "[t]he courts of appeals ... 
shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the dis­
trict court."240 The majority supported its holding with several rea­
sons. First, the majority found that bail could only be granted in 
extradition cases by "courtS."241 Consequently, the majority rea­
soned that the bail decision in Kirby was a decision of a district 
court.242 Second, the majority concluded that the grant of bail 
given in this case was a final decision because it is similar to a bail 
decision in a domestic criminal case which, according to the major­
ity's analysis, is a final decision.243 The majority held that, because 
the decision was a final decision of the district court, the decision 
was reviewable within the jurisdiction provided to the courts of ap­
236. See supra Part I.A.2 for a discussion of the granting of bail within the extra­
dition process. 
237. 106 F.3d 855 (9th Cir. 1997). 
238. Other courts have reviewed bail decisions in extradition cases; however, 
Kirby was the first to explain that § 1291 provides the basis of jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Kin-Hong, 83 F.3d 523 (1st Cir. 1996) (reversing 
district court's grant of bail); In re Extradition of Smyth, 976 F.2d 1535 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(same); United States v. Williams, 611 F.2d 914 (1st Cir. 1979) (same); cf. Hu Yau­
Leung v. Soscia, 649 F.2d 914, 920 (2d Cir. 1981) (affirming grant of bail by district 
court in habeas case following magistrate's issuance of certificate of extraditability). 
239. See supra Parts II.B and II.C, respectively, for a detailed discussion of the 
majority and dissenting opinions in Kirby. 
240. Kirby, 106 F.3d at 859 (quoting 28 u.s.c. § 1291 (1994». 
241. See id. (quoting Wrightv. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 63 (1903». 
242. See id. 
243. See id. at 860. 
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peals by § 1291.244 
Conversely, the dissent concluded that appellate jurisdiction is 
not available to the courts of appeals for review of a grant of bail 
given by a district court judge.245 The dissent also supported its 
finding with several reasons. The dissent found that where there is 
no explicit statutory grant of power, courts are powerless to act.246 
Next, the dissent, stating that the power to hear extradition cases is 
not a judicial power, found that grants of bail in international extra­
dition matters are not decisions of the court.247 The dissent also 
disagreed with the majority's classification of the bail decision as a 
final decision.248 The dissent concluded its reasoning by asserting 
that the right to confer this jurisdiction lies with Congress and not 
the courtS.249 Recognizing that the opinions rendered in Kirby 
make justifiable points, this Note, nevertheless, argues that a 
sounder decision could have been reached in Kirby. This analysis 
begins by highlighting the questionable bases of the majority's 
reasomng. 
A. 	 Bail Decisions in International Extradition Cases Are Not 
Final Decisions 
In determining that bail decisions in extradition matters are fi­
nal, the majority relied on § 3145 of the Bail Reform Act of 1984.250 
As described earlier, § 3145 controls appeals from grants of bail in 
domestic criminal cases by magistrates or other persons who are not 
judges of the court of original jurisdiction over the matter.251 The 
majority stressed the language of § 3731, which states that such ap­
peals are "governed by section 1291 and by section 3731" of Title 
28.252 The majority focused on the words of § 3145, stating that ap­
peals from bail decisions in criminal cases are governed by § 1291, 
which governs appellate review of final decisions.253 The majority 
244. 	 See id. 
245. 	 See id. a~ 865 (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
246. 	 See id. (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
247. 	 See id. at 866 (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
248. 	 See id. (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
249. 	 See id. at 867 (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
250. See id. at 860; see also 18 U.S.c. § 3145 (1994). For a discussion of the rele­
vant portion of the Kirby decision, see supra Part n.B.2.b. 
251. 18 U.S.c. § 3145 (1994). For the sake of clarity, assume that any future ref­
erence to grants of bailor bail decisions made by magistrates includes within it a refer­
ence to grants of bailor bail decisions made by any other persons who are not judges of 
the court of original jurisdiction over the matter. 
252. 	 See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 860 (quoting 18 U.S.c. § 3145 (1994». 
253. 	 See id. 
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then concluded "[t]hus by reason of 18 U.S.c. § 3145, bail decisions 
in criminal cases are 'final' within the meaning of section 1291."254 
In reaching this conclusion, the majority implied that § 1292, which 
governs interlocutory appeals, would have been specified in § 3145 
as governing appeals from grants of bail in domestic cases if bail 
decisions, in general, were merely interlocutory.255 
Comparing bail decisions in extradition cases with bail deci­
sions in domestic criminal cases and finding little difference, the 
majority concluded that bail decisions, irrespective of the context in 
which they are made, are final decisions.256 Confidently, the major­
ity stated, "To rebut this presumption, there must be a principled 
basis for holding that bail decisions in extradition cases are some­
how 'less final' than bail decisions in criminal cases."257 Yet, the 
majority's argument rests on the assumption that grants of bail in 
criminal cases, which are similar to extradition cases, are final deci­
. sions. This assumption is questionable. 
In order to find that criminal bail decisions were final, the ma­
jority mistakenly relied on § 3145 as the parallel jurisdictional pro­
vision supporting appeals from grants of bail in domestic criminal 
cases. However, § 3145 actually governs bail decisions made by 
magistrates.258 Section 3731, on the other hand, governs appeals of 
grants of bail by district court judges and provides the true analyti­
cal parallel.259 A district court judge made the bail decision in 
Kirby, not a magistrate.260 The Kirby majority's mistaken reliance 
on § 3145 is significant because § 3731, unlike § 3145, does not con­
tain any language recognizing § 1291261 as a governing rule. Thus, if 
the Kirby majority had relied on the true statutory parallel in this 
case to make its argument, it would have been left without a basis 
for its argument. The language of § 3145, which states that § 1291, 
in conjunction with § 3731, controls grants of bail, relates to appeals 
from decisions by magistrates, not decisions by district court 
judges.262 
Assuming that the above distinction is not dispositive, an addi­
254. Id. 
255. See id. 
256. See id. 
257. Id. 
258. 18 U.S.c. § 3145 (1994); see also supra note 50 for the text of § 3145. 
259. 18 U.S.c. § 3731 (1994); see also supra note 48 for the text of § 3731. 
260. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 857. 
261. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994). 
262. See 18 U.S.C. § 3145 (1994); see also 18 U.S.c. § 3731 (1994), which ad­
dresses appeals of decisions by district court judges. 
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tiona! flaw in the majority's reasoning occurs at this point of the 
Kirby opinion. The majority ignored the language of § 3145 which 
states that § 3731 also governs bail decisions.263 Section 3731 pro­
vides that appeal by the United States of an adverse bail decision by 
a district court lies with a court of appeals.264 As noted by the dis­
sent, if bail decisions in criminal cases were final, then this portion 
of § 3731 would have been unnecessary because the United States 
would have already been able to appeal the decision as a final deci­
sion.265 Further, the legislative history of § 3145 contradicts the ma­
jority's position that the reference to § 1291 in § 3145 equates bail 
decisions with finality.266 
After the enactment of the Bail Reform Act of 1984, § 3731 
explicitly grants the government the right to appeal an adverse bail 
decision.267 It follows that § 1291 alone was not sufficient to grant 
jurisdiction to the courts of appeals over appeals by the government 
from adverse domestic bail rulings. The legislative history of § 3145 
discloses the reasoning behind the legislature's choice to specify 
both § 1291 and § 3145 as governing bail decisions in criminal cases. 
In analyzing § 3145, the Senate noted that "[a]ppeals under 
this section are to be governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1291 in the case ofan 
appeal by the defendant and by 18 U.S.c. § 3731 in the case of an 
appeal by the government."268 Hence, the legislative history of 
§ 3145 contradicts the majority's position that bail decisions are al­
ways final decisions. While bail decisions may be considered final 
under the majority's reasoning when adverse to the defendant, bail 
decisions adverse to the government are not.269 In fact, the legisla­
tive history explicitly shows that the legislature did not intend its 
reference to § 1291 to signify that grants of bail are final.270 
Section 1291 by itself does not confer jurisdiction to review bail 
decisions in domestic criminal cases when the government is the 
appellant. Similarly, § 1291 can not by itself provide jurisdiction for 
review of bail decisions in international extradition cases when the 
government is the appellant. In addition to the questionable as­
263. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 860. 
264. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1994). 
265. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 867 (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
266. See SENATE COMMITTEE ON TIiE JUDICIARY, S. REP. No. 98-225, at 29-30 
(1983), reprinted in 1984 V.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3212-13. 
267. 18 U.S.c. § 3731 (1994). 
268. SENATE COMMITTEE ON lHE JUDICIARY, S. REp. No. 98-225, at 29 (1983), 
reprinted in 1984 V.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3212 (emphasis added). 
269. See id. 
270. See id. 
609 1999] INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION GRANTS OF BAIL 
sumptions described above, the majority's argument that courts 
may act without explicit authority is also dubious. 
B. 	 The Majority's Argument that Courts May Act Without 
Explicit Authority is Not Supported 
Countering the dissent's suggestion that without explicit statu­
tory authority there can be no review, the majority pointed to the 
Second Circuit's exercise of jurisdiction in Iuteri v. Nardoza.271 In 
Iuteri, the Second Circuit reviewed a grant of bail given by a district 
court judge pending a decision on luteri's petition for a writ of 
habeas cOrpUS.272 Since Iuteri was decided prior to the enactment 
of the Bail Reform Act of 1984, there was, at that time, no explicit 
statutory authority which authorized review of a grant of bail in a 
domestic criminal case.273 Once enacted, §§ 3145 and 3731 of the 
Bail Reform Act of 1984, respectively, explicitly provided that 
grants of bail by magistrates and district court judges can be imme­
diately appealed.274 
The majority stated that by enacting §§ 3145 and 3731, Con­
gress was making explicit the appellate jurisdiction which was im­
plicit before.275 However, a close examination of § 3145's 
legislative history reveals that the legislature did not necessarily ac­
cept that it was providing jurisdiction where it had been implicit 
previously.276 In regard to the amendments made to § 3145, the 
Senate stated that: 
Section 3145, in conjunction with the amendment to 18 U.S.c. 
3731, would specifically authorize the government, as well as the 
defendant, to seek review and appeal of release decisions. The 
Bail Reform Act [of 1996] makes no provisions for review of de­
cisions upon motion of the government, although this authority 
may be implicit in the Act.277 
After appearing to recognize that this authority may have been 
implicit, the Senate added a footnote citing to United States v. Zuc­
caro ,278 a case holding that the right of the government to seek re­
271. 	 662 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1981); see also Kirby, 106 F.3d at 860 & n.6. 
272. 	 See Iuteri, 662 F.2d at 161. 
273. 	 See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 860 n.6. 
274. 	 18 V.S.c. §§ 3145, 3731 (1994). 
275. 	 See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 860 n.6. 
276. See SENATE COMMfITEE ON THE JUDICIARY, S. REp. No. 98-225, at 29-30 
(1983), reprinted in 1984 V.S.C.C.A.N. at 3212-13. 
277. 	 Id. at 30, reprinted in 1984 V.S.C.C.A.N. 3213. 
278. 	 645 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1981). 
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consideration of a bail determination by the trial court is implicit in 
the Bail Reform Act [of 1966).279 Next, the Senate stated, "[s]ince 
18 U.S.C. 3147(b) [of the Bail Reform Act of 1966] permits appeal 
of release decisions only when the defendant has been detained, it is 
doubtful that the government has any right to appeal, as opposed to 
a right to seek reconsideration under the Act."28o As the legislature 
noted, before the enactment of the Bail Reform Act of 1984, appeal 
of release decisions was not permitted when the defendant had 
been granted bail.281 The legislature thus concluded that the right 
of the government to appeal was "doubtful," despite the fact that 
the Zuccaro court may have found it was implicit.282 
The majority, at this juncture, was attempting to establish that 
if jurisdiction was implicit to review grants of bail in domestic crimi­
nal cases before enactment of explicit statutory authority, then ju­
risdiction is implicit in this case to review grants of bail in 
international extradition cases without explicit statutory author­
ity.283 However, simply because Congress eventually sanctioned 
the exercise of jurisdiction by courts like Zuccaro, which in fact 
lacked explicit jurisdiction, the eventual sanction does not signify 
that Congress has delegated its power to determine jurisdiction to 
the courts. 
Having addressed several difficulties with the Kirby majority's 
analysis, this Note will now turn its attention to providing a simpler 
solution to this issue. The Kirby court did not need to force grants 
of bail given by district court judges into the category of "final deci­
sions" in order to obtain jurisdiction over the matter. Rather, the 
Kirby court could have relied on the collateral order doctrine to 
tailor a solution to the problem. 
C. 	 The Kirby Court Did Not Address the Collateral Order 
Doctrine 
An alternative avenue for conferring jurisdiction on the United 
States Courts of Appeals to review bail decisions by district court 
judges in international extradition cases, which was not addressed 
by either the majority or the dissent in Kirby, is the collateral order 
279. See SENATE COMMfITEE ON THE JUDICIARY, S. REp. No. 98-225, at 30 0.93 
(1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3213 0.93. 
280. 	 Id. (emphasis added). 
281. 	 See 18 U.S.c. § 3147(b) (repealed 1984). 
282. See SENATE COMMfITEE ON THE JUDICIARY, S. REp. No. 98-225, at 300.93 
(1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3213 0.93. 
283. 	 See Uoited States v. Kirby, 106 F.3d 855, 860 (9th Cir. 1997). 
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doctrine. The collateral order doctrine operates to allow review of 
decisions that are collateral to the merits and which conclusively 
determine an important issue. 
In order to fall within the collateral order doctrine, the deci­
sion "must: [1] conclusively determine the disputed question [2] re­
solve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the 
case, and [3] be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final 
judgment."284 Grants of bail in international extradition matters 
fall squarely within these requirements. 
Grants of bail in international extradition matters meet the 
first requirement of the collateral order doctrine because they con­
clusively determine the question of whether potential extraditees 
will be released on bail.285 After the bail decision is made, either 
bail is granted or bail is refused. When bail is denied, the potential 
extraditee may receive review of sorts by petitioning for a writ of 
habeas cOrpUS.286 However, when bail is granted by the district 
court, the decision will not be reviewed prior to trial.287 In addi­
tion, bail decisions in extradition cases meet the second require­
ment of the collateral order doctrine because they are separate 
from the merits of an extradition case.288 The merits·of an extradi­
tion case involve a determination of whether a person sought by a 
284. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978). See supra Part 
I.B.3.a for a discussion of the origin and application of the collateral order doctrine. 
285. See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977). In Abney, the Supreme 
Court found that an order denying a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds was 
immediately appealable because it constituted a "complete, formal, and, in the trial 
court, final rejection of an accused's [claim]." Id. at 651, 659. Similarly, the grant of 
bail in this case, if not reviewable, constitutes a final answer to the bail question. 
286. See Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1101 (1980) (stating that 
habeas corpus review of an extradition decision is limited to "'whether the magistrate 
had jurisdiction, whether the offense charged is within the treaty and, by a somewhat 
liberal extension, whether there was any evidence warranting the finding that there was 
reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty"') (quoting Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 
U.S. 311, 312 (1925)); see also Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 901 (2d Cir. 1973) 
(recognizing that the magistrate's decision is not appealable, but that the extraditee 
may obtain review by way of a writ of habeas corpus). See generally BASSIOUNI, supra 
note 23, at 737-49; Hall, supra note 23, at 605. 
287. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 
U.S. 139 (1993) (citation omitted). 
288. See 18 U.S.c. § 3184 (1994 & Supp. II 1996) (stating that during an extradi­
tion hearing the judicial body will determine whether the evidence is sufficient to sus­
tain the charge under the provisions of the applicable treaty); see also Collins v. Loisel, 
259 U.S. 309, 314-16 (1922) (stating that an extradition hearing merely decides whether 
there is competent evidence which, according to the law of the surrendering nation, 
would justify the accused's apprehension and commitment for trial if the crime had 
been committed in the surrendering nation). See supra Part l.A.l for a detailed de­
Scription of the extradition hearing and the issues resolved therein. 
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foreign country will be extradited.289 The determination as to bail 
has no relation to the determination as to extradition; therefore, it 
is separate from the merits of the case. 
In Stack v. Boyle,290 the Supreme Court, citing Cohen v. Bene­
ficial Loan Corp. ,291 held that an order denying a motion to reduce 
excessive bail was immediately appealable. Although the Supreme 
Court was discussing a bail decision in a domestic criminal case, the 
Court noted that an order fixing bail is "entirely independent of the 
issues to be tried."292 The Supreme Court later noted, in Carroll v. 
United States ,293 that even in criminal cases, where the use of the 
collateral order doctrine is rare, "[t]he only decision of [the 
Supreme Court] applying to a criminal case the reasoning of Cohen 
v. Beneficial Loan Corp. . . . held that an order relating to the 
amount of bail to be exacted falls into this category."294 
The issues to be tried during an extradition hearing center 
around whether the potential extraditee will be certified for extra­
dition.295 Thus, similar to the bail decision in a domestic criminal 
case, the bail decision in an international extradition case is in­
dependent from the issue to be tried, which is, specifically, whether 
the accused will be extradited. 
Lastly, bail decisions in extradition cases meet the third re­
quirement because the decision to grant bail is effectively unreview­
able upon appeal from a final judgment.296 If the government was 
required to wait until the final decision in an extradition case, it 
would lose its opportunity to have the potential extraditee, who was 
released on bail, placed back in custody while awaiting their extra­
dition hearing. The ultimate decision as to whether to certify the 
extraditee would moot any review of the bail release. Either the 
potential extraditee would be certified for extradition and ulti­
mately surrendered to the requesting nation, or the potential ex­
289. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 23, at 656; see also Collins, 259 U.S. at 316 (stat· 
ing that an extradition hearing decides whether there is competent evidence that would 
justify holding the accused for trial, and not whether it would suffice for a conviction). 
290. 342 U.S. 1, 6 (1951). 
291. 337 U.S. 541,545-47 (1949). 
292. Stack, 342 U.S. at 12 (Jackson, J.). 
293. 354 U.S. 394 (1957). 
294. Id. at 403 (emphasis added). 
295. See supra Part 1.A.1 for a discussion of the issues to be determined during an 
extradition hearing. 
296. See Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1985) (stating 
that the reach of the collateral order doctrine is "limited to trial court orders affecting 
rights that will be irretrievably lost in the absence of an immediate appeal"). 
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traditee would be released because certification for extradition 
could not be obtained.297 With either result, the question of 
whether the potential extraditee was properly released while await­
ing his extradition hearing would be moot. Accordingly, review 
must be had before the extradition hearing or the right to have the 
bail decision reviewed would be lost forever.298 
In Kirby, the court turned a blind eye to the collateral order 
doctrine.299 The majority cited Iuteri v. Nardoza 3OO for the proposi­
tion that courts have acted before where explicit statutory grants of 
power were lacking.30r However, in citing Iuteri to make the point 
that courts have acted without explicit jurisdiction, the majority 
completely overlooked the Iuteri court's use of the collateral order 
doctrine. The Iuteri court did not act without jurisdiction. Rather, 
it reviewed whether the district court's order, which granted an ac­
cused bail pending a decision on his petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus, was an appealable collateral order.302 The majority in 
297. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 23, at 656 ("In the event that the individual is 
found to be non-extraditable, the proceedings end."). See supra notes 35-39 and ac­
companying text for a discussion of the procedures remaining after the extradition 
hearing. 
298. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526-30 (1985) (holding that an 
order involving qualified immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral order 
doctrine); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 748 (1982) (holding that an order involving 
absolute immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine); 
United States v. P.H.E., Inc., 965 F.2d 848, 853-56 (10th Cir. 1992) (allowing immediate 
appeal of a denial of a claim of bad faith prosecution because the right not to be tried is 
lost once tried). But see United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 858-61 (1978) 
(holding that order denying a motion to dismiss based on alleged violation of right to a 
speedy trial was not immediately appealable because review of the order could be had 
at a later time); United States v. Jackson, 30 F.3d 572, 574 (5th Cir. 1994) (denying 
inrmediate review of alleged violation of Speedy Trial Act because a dismissal without 
prejudice is not a final judgment); United States v. Holub, 944 F.2d 441, 442 (8th Cir. 
1991) (same); United States v. Buchanan, 946 F.2d 325, 327 (4th Cir. 1991) (denying 
review of a motion to dismiss when defendant entered into a plea bargain where further 
action by the court may be had). 
299. The dissent, mirroring the language of the collateral order doctrine, stated 
that the grant of bail at issue in Kirby did not conclusively determin[e] a disputed ques­
tion. See United States v. Kirby, 106 F.3d 855, 866 (9th Cir. 1997) (Noonan, J., dissent­
ing). Nonetheless, the Kirby court never explicitly addressed the collateral order 
doctrine. 
300. 662 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir.1981). 
301. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 860 n.6. 
302.. See Iuteri, 662 F.2d 159 at 161. Although the Iuteri court did not explicitly 
mention the collateral order doctrine, its language negated the need to mention it ex­
plicitly. The Iuteri court stated that "[b]ecause the district court's bail order gave peti­
tioner relief which was collateral to the underlying proceeding, and not subject to 
meaningful review on an appeal from the habeas corpus determination, its order may 
be treated as final." Id. 
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Kirby could have used the same approach with the result being a 
much sounder basis for jurisdiction. 
Speculating that use of the collateral order doctrine will prove 
unsatisfactory to the federal judiciary because of its controversial 
development,3°3 an alternative solution to the issue raised in Kirby 
lies in the Supreme Court's rulemaking power.304 
D. 	 The Supreme Court Could Use Its Rule-Making Power to Put 
an End to the Problem of Defining Finality Through 
Case Law 
Another possible solution to the jurisdictional issue raised in 
Kirby, short of an explicit statutory amendment305 authorizing the 
courts of appeals to review grants of bail in international extradi­
tion cases, is found in the Supreme Court's rulemaking power. 
When 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) was enacted, Congress provided the 
Supreme Court with power to "prescribe rules, in accordance with 
section 2072 of this title, to provide for an appeal of an interlocu­
tory decision to the courts of appeals that is not otherwise provided 
for under subsection (a), (b), (c), or (d)."306 Thus, as delineated by 
§ 2072 of the Rules Enabling Act, the Supreme Court may use this 
power to prescribe rules pertaining to procedure in the courts of 
appeals so long as such rules do not "abridge, enlarge or modify any 
substantive right."307 
In addition, § 2072 was recently amended to state that rules 
enacted by the Supreme Court ."may define when a ruling of a dis­
trict court is final for purposes of appeal under section 1291 of this 
title."308 Pursuant to this authority, the Supreme Court may iden­
tify specific categories of interlocutory rulings that may be reviewed 
on interlocutory appeal.309 Congress thereby gave the Supreme 
Court the power to provide for interlocutory review of orders that 
303. See supra Part I.C.4.c for a discussion of the development of the collateral 
order doctrine. 
304. See supra notes 107-115 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
Supreme Court's rulemaking power. 
305. In fact, legislation, although unsuccessful, has been proposed to revise the 
final judgment rule. See H.R. 3152, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., the proposed Court Reform 
and Access to Justice Act of 1987, Title VII. 
306. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) (1994). 
307. Id. § 2072(b). 
308. Id. § 2072(c), as added by Act of Dec. 1, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 315, 
104 Stat. 5089, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.GA.N. 5115. 
309. See id. §§ 2072(c), 1292(e); see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 54, § 3907, at 
283. 
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are not currently reviewable on interlocutory appeal. The Supreme 
Court should make use of this power and resolutely lay to rest the 
problems surrounding the definition of finality,3l0 
The Supreme Court may handle the issue in one of two ways. 
The Court could prescribe rules that specifically enumerate which 
categories of decisions are appealable, or, it could attempt yet again 
to define "finality." Arguably, based on the lengthy discussion in 
this Note concerning the problems with defining finality satisfacto­
rily, the more practical solution would be for the Supreme Court to 
use its rulemaking power to specifically identify those decisions that 
are immediately appealable.311 
CONCLUSION 
The issue of whether the courts of appeals may review grants 
of bail given by district court judges in international extradition 
matters is, as evidenced by this Note, extremely complex. Nonethe­
less, the issue lends itself to rather simple solutions. Rather than 
arguing that bail decisions are final decisions so as to invoke the 
jurisdiction provided by § 1291, courts of appeals can rely on the 
collateral order doctrine to confer jurisdiction to review these 
grants of bail. Alternatively, the Supreme Court could use its rule­
making power to define a final decision once and for all. The 
Supreme Court may use this power either to define finality or, more 
wisely, to delineate those categories of decisions that are immedi­
ately appealable. The only remaining question is whether it will be 
the United States Supreme Court or the United States Courts of 
Appeals that will appropriately define the basis of jurisdiction to 
undertake appellate review of grants of bail made by district court 
judges in international extradition cases. 
Gina Barry 
310. See REpORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, Part II at 95 
(Apr. 2, 1990) ("Decisional doctrines-such as 'practical finality' and especially the 
'collateral order rule'-blur the edges of the finality principle, require repeated atten­
tion from the Supreme Court, and may in some circumstances restrict too sharply the 
opportunity for interlocutory review."). 
311. Cf. David D. Siegel, Changes in Federal Jurisdiction and Practice Under the 
New (Dec. 1, 1990) Judicial Improvements Act, 133 F.R.D. 61, 80 (1991) ("Until the 
rules are in place pursuant to this new subdivision, the case law will apparently continue 
to determine finality under § 1291."). 
